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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Practice and Procedure-Tenants
of a Public Housing Project Must be Accorded Due Process Pro-
tections Before the Promulgation of an Across-the-Board Rent
Increase. Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 479
F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973).
Plaintiffs were tenants in apartments controlled and operated by
the defendant New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, a public
corporation organized under New York State law to provide low rent
housing for persons with low incomes.' In June 1971, the chairman
of the housing authority notified all tenants of the imposition of a
$2.00 per room per month service charge.' Several tenants instituted
an action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 3 and asked the
court to declare the service charge invalid and enjoin the adoption
of any such increase unless the tenants were first accorded a hearing
on the merits.'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in granting plaintiffs' summary judgment, held that plaintiffs
had a due process right to notice and a full adversary-type hearing
before being required to pay higher rents or an across-the-board
service charge. ' The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit modi-
fied the lower court judgment, and held that while tenants must be
granted certain due process rights before the imposition of an
across-the-board rent increase, their rights in these circumstances
can be adequately protected without a formal adversary hearing.'
1. Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165,
1166-67 (2d Cir. 1973), modifying 347 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. Id. at 1167.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: "Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proceeding for redress."
4. 479 F.2d at 1167.
5. 347 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
6. 479 F.2d at 1169-70.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Initially, cases in the area of procedural due process centered on
the "right-privilege" distinction. Government benefits were consid-
ered "privileges" in which the individual recipient had no "right"
and therefore no constitutionally protected interest.7 Relying on this
distinction, some courts have held that housing authorities could
act both arbitrarily and summarily. In recent years, however, there
has been a growing disfavor with the distinction, and a new test for
determining whether procedural due process will be required has
gradually developed.'
The breakthrough occurred in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Corn-
mittee v. McGrath,"' where Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion rejected a "right-privilege" analysis and outlined the factors
to be weighed in considering the elements of due process required
in a particular situation." According to Justice Frankfurter, the
implementation of procedural protections depends on the extent to
which an individual may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." '
A decade later, a majority of the Court followed this lead in
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,"3 a case involv-
7. E.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam). See Note,
Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 880, 888 (1973).
8. United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1963); Brand v.
Chicago Housing Auth., 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941); Chicago Housing
Auth. v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App. 282, 93 N.E.2d 386 (1950); Columbus Metro.
Housing Auth. v. Simpson, 85 Ohio App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560 (1949); Pitts-
burgh Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963).
9. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity
to be Heard in the Administrative Process, 51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942).
10. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
11. Id. at 163. Factors to be considered are: (1) nature of the interest
involved, (2) manner in which the interest was adversely affected, (3)
reason why interest was disturbed, (4) availability of an alternative, and
(5) general balancing of the interest involved. Justice Frankfurter's reason-
ing was supported in separate opinions by Justices Black, Douglas, and
Jackson.
12. Id. at 168.
13. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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ing a worker who was summarily barred from his place of work for
security reasons. In McElroy, the Court held that "consideration of
what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise na-
ture of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest" affected by the governmental action. Once this determi-
nation is made, the public (government function) and the private
interest must be balanced to determine the procedures that due
process may require.'5 In Sherbert v. Verner,'" where unemployment
compensation benefits were denied solely because of appellant's re-
fusal to accept employment that required her to work on Saturday
contrary to her religious belief, the Court said that a procedural due
process challenge could not be answered by the argument that un-
employment compensation benefits were a "privilege" and not a
"right."'"
The Court's decisions on the "right-privilege" doctrine culmi-
nated in Goldberg v. Kelly,'8 a case where a welfare recipient de-
manded a hearing before benefits were discontinued. The Court
found that welfare benefits were a matter of statutory entitlement' "
14. Id. at 895.
15. See generally id. at 895-99.
16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. Id. at 404.
18. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
19. Id. at 262. It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like "property" than a "gratuity." Much of the existing wealth in
this country takes the form of rights which do not fall within traditional
common-law concepts of property. It has been aptly noted that "[s]ociety
today is built around entitlement. The automobile dealer has his franchise,
the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union
membership, contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and
stock options; all are devices to aid security and independence. Many of
the most important of these entitlements now flow from government: sub-
sidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for
television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education;
social security pensions for individuals. Such sources of security, whether
private or public, are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the
recipients they are essentials, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of
charity. It is only the poor whose entitlements, although recognized by
public policy, have not been effectively enforced." Reich, Individual
19741]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
for persons qualified to receive them, that the recipient was "imme-
diately desperate," and that the termination of such benefits in-
volves state action affecting important rights.2 ' Based on these facts,
the Court concluded that the extent to which due process is required
"depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss
(of status) outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudi-
cation.'"
Since Goldberg, the Court has utilized a two step process in ana-
lyzing cases involving deprivation of a government benefit.22 The
initial step requires a determination of whether the interest sought
to be protected is, under the due process clause, a "property" inter-
est or a "liberty" interest. 3 Should the interest fall into either of
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245,
1255 (1965). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
20. 397 U.S. at 263.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
23. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972). "[Liberty] denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). A "property inter-
est" subject to procedural due process protection is not limited by a few
rigid, technical forms. Rather "property" denotes a broad range of inter-
ests secured by existing rules or understanding. 408 U.S. at 577. A person's
interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.
Id. The Supreme Court has held that a person receiving welfare benefits
under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them,
has a property interest in continued receipt of those benefits, that is safe-
guarded by procedural due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Similarly, in the area of public employment, the Court has held that a
public college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provi-
sions, Slochower v. Board of Educ. 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and college profes-
sors and staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts,
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), have property interests in con-
tinued employment that are protected by due process. 408 U.S. at 576-77.
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these two categories, a further step is taken. This second step in-
volves a Goldberg balancing. 4 The court is required to weigh the
importance of the interests involved, and the efficacy of the re-
quested procedure in protecting those interests, against the cost of
requiring the procedure.25
As a result of these cases, there has been a growing awareness that
when a government adopts a statutory scheme of low and middle-
income housing the governmental landlord and the tenants are in a
posture quite different from the usual landlord-tenant relation-
ship.2 ' Since the acts of the landlord are the acts of the state, hous-
ing authorities are subject to due process requirements." This has
been manifested most noticeably in the area of evictions, where the
trend is to require that the governmental landlord have cause to
evict, give the tenant notice of that cause, and hold a hearing at
which the tenant can contest the action."
In Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Authority," the court held that
state action in the housing sphere was necessarily subject to the
same constitutional commands applicable to any governmental ac-
tion:
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-90 (1972).
25. Id. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970). See also
Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86
HARV. L. REV. 880, 889-90 (1973).
26. McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1129 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd,
438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
27. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955). In Rudder,
the court rejected the claim that a housing authority has the same freedom
to evict tenants as a private landlord and said: "The government as land-
lord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private
landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law. Arbitrary
action is not due process." 226 F.2d at 53. See also Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
28. Brown v. Housing Auth., 471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1972); Caulder v.
Durham Housing Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1003 (1971); Glover v. Housing Auth., 444 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1971); Escal-
era v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 App.
Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2d Dep't 1968), aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 675, 262
N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970).
29. 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (2d Dep't 1968).
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"Idlue process of law . . . is not confined to judicial proceedings, but ex-
tends to every case which may deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property,
whether the proceeding be judicial, administrative, or executive in its na-
ture." Once the State embarks into the area of housing as a function of
government, necessarily that function, like other governmental functions, is
subject to the constitutional commands."
In Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,3 the court, in
holding that tenants in public housing projects could not be consti-
tutionally evicted without being accorded adequate procedural safe-
guards, stated:
[Tihe tenant should be notified in advance of the complete grounds for the
proposed action; should have access to all the information upon which any
decision will be based, and should be afforded the right to confront and cross
examine witnesses in appropriate circumstances [and] . ..should be af-
forded the opportunity to present his side of the case in the presence of an
impartial official .... 32
Rent increases have received considerable attention in recent
cases, : ' with the courts divided on whether this action necessitates
due process protection. The first case in which tenants sought proce-
dural protection prior to a rent increase was Hahn v. Gottlieb,3
wherein members of a tenants association sought to enjoin Federal
Housing Authority (FHA) approval of a rent increase for a privately
owned federally subsidized project. 5 The Court of Appeals for the
30. Id. at 340-41, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163, citing Stuart v. Palmer, 76 N.Y.
183 (1878).
31. 425 F.2d 853.
32. Id. at 863 (citations omitted).
33. Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 479 F.2d 1165 (2d
Cir. 1973); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971);
Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970); Keller v. Maremount
Foundation, C-71-1585 RFP (N.D. Cal., June 16, 1972), summarized at 2
CCH POVERTY L. REP. 11 16,403; Armbrester v. Albany Housing Auth., 71-
Civ.-21 (N.D.N.Y., Jan. 24, 1972); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Feder-
ated Mortgage Investors, C-70-104 SAW (N.D. Cal., Jan. 3, 1972), summa-
rized at 2 CCH POVERTY L. REP. J 16,402.
34. 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970). A section 221(d)(3) project is a
privately owned federally subsidized housing complex, providing housing
for those "families with incomes that do not permit home ownership at
current construction costs and at market interest rates, but who have
[Vol. II
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First Circuit, in deciding that the tenants had no right to due pro-
cess protections prior to a rent increase, distinguished Hahn from
Goldberg on the grounds that: (1) Hahn was not legally "entitled"
to low rent in the same sense that the welfare recipient in Goldberg
was entitled to basic sustenance;" (2) the government action in this
case (a rent increase) posed a less serious threat to the private
interest than the termination of welfare benefits, which deprived the
recipient of the means of existence, or the eviction in Escalera which
meant the total loss of decent low-rent housing;37 (3) rent increases
involve legislative rather than adjudicative facts;3" and (4) the gov-
incomes too high for public low-rent housing." S. REP. No. 281, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3, 4 (1961). Congressional recognition of low income families' need
for housing is enunciated in the Housing Act of 1949 which established as
the national housing policy "the realization as soon as feasible of the goal
of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family . . . ." National Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1441, 1441a
(1970). The rental housing program established by § 221(d)(3) is one of
several strategems created by Congress to help achieve that goal. The
statute itself indicates that the program is "designed to assist private
industry in providing housing for low and moderate income families and
displaced families." National Housing Act, § 221(a), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(a)
(1970)." Note, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 83 n.1 (1972). This assistance to
the private sector takes two forms; first, the FHA provides insurance on
long-term mortgage loans covering up to 90 percent of a project's cost, thus
encouraging private investment in projects which would otherwise be too
risky. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(4)(iv) (1970). Second, eligible borrowers can
obtain below-market interest rates on FHA insured loans, thus reducing
the rentals necessary to service the landlord's debt obligations. 12 U.S.C.
§ 17151(d)(5) (1970). See 430 F.2d at 1245; Note, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
83 n.1 (1972).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1248. At this point, the Hahn court relied on Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). In char-
acterizing the process of FHA approval of a rent increase as "ratemaking,"
turning on general economic conditions rather than specific factual dis-
putes, like those which might be involved in an eviction proceeding, the
first circuit held that the procedural safeguards of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment "are characteristic of adjudicatory proceedings,
where the outcome turns on accurate resolution of specific factual disputes.
Such safeguards are not, however, essential in 'legislative' proceedings,
such as rate-making, where decision depends on broad familiarity with
1974]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ernment interest in maintaining procedural flexibility is greater
than any of the private interests which weighed against granting a
hearing as in Goldberg."9
Approximately one year later, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc."° The facts, simi-
lar to those of Hahn,4 involved tenants in a housing project owned
by the defendant and constructed under a low and middle income
housing program authorized by section 221(d)(3) of the National
Housing Act." The landlord filed an application for a rent increase
which the FHA subsequently granted. Many tenants refused to pay.
Chenango instituted a suit in the New York courts for either rents
due or for the eviction of tenants who had not paid the increase. The
tenants, having been denied access to all information submitted by
Chenango to the FHA relevant to the rent increase and denied an
opportunity to present opposing material, commenced an action to
enjoin the increase and declare the FHA approval of the rent in-
economic conditions." Id. (citations omitted). See also Note, 1 FORDHAM
URBAN L.J. 83, 89 (1972). "[A]djudicative facts are those to which the law
is applied in the process of adjudication. They are the facts that normally
go to the jury in a jury case. They relate to the parties, their activities, their
properties, their businesses. Legislative facts are the facts which help the
tribunal determine the content of law and of policy and help the tribunal
to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action
to take. Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the
immediate parties. . . . The exceedingly practical difference between leg-
islative and adjudicative facts is that, apart from facts properly noticed,
the tribunal's findings of adjudicative facts must be supported by evi-
dence, but findings or assumptions of legislative facts need not be, fre-
quently are not, and sometimes cannot be supported by evidence." K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 15.03, at 272 (1959). See also K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 7.03, 7.05 (1972); Davis, The Require-
ment of A Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1956); Comment,
Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare Cases, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 604, 605 (1969); Comment, The Constitutional Minimum
for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements
of a Prior Hearing, 68 MICH. L. REV. 112, 123-24 (1969).
39. 430 F.2d at 1245-46, 1248.
40. 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971).
41. Id. at 298-99. See Note, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 83, 89 (1972).
42. See note 35 supra.
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crease violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. :'
The court denied the tenants' claim for a pre-rent increase hearing."
Although the court found that the facts involved in the tenants' case
were adjudicative rather than legislative," the majority decision was
based on the grounds that "here the Government did not itself
increase the rents but simply allowed the landlord to institute an
increase upon the termination of existing tenancies, as the landlord
would have been legally free to do but for its regulatory agreement
with the FHA."'' By basing the decision on private ownership the
Langevin court minimized both the relevancy of the public interest
in denying the increase 7 and the nature of the facts in dispute.4"
These criteria were used by the Hahn court in deciding that a rent
increase does not necessitate due process protections.49 In effect, the
second circuit in Langevin implicitly rejected the rule enunciated
by the first circuit in Hahn.5 ' 1 The court in Langevin leaves no doubt
that had the landlord been a public body the decision would have
been otherwise.5'
Shortly thereafter, in Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v.
Federated Mortgage Investors,2 tenants in a federally assisted Cali-
fornia housing project 3 sought a pre-rent increase hearing. The dis-
43. 447 F.2d at 299.
44. Id. at 300-02.
45. Id. at 300. See also discussion in note 35 supra.
46. Id. at 301. Judge Oakes, in his dissent, was not persuaded by the
majority's argument that the government did not itself increase the rent,
but allowed the landlord to implement the increase. Id. at 304. Judge
Oakes wrote "[tlo my mind, a tenant in a project financed with the use
of public funds at subsidized interest rates should stand in no worse shoes
than the tenants in, say, city housing authority projects. The distinction
advanced by the majority, that here the Government did not itself increase
the rents but simply allowed the landlord to institute an increase, is to me
a distinction without a difference." Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 301.
48. Id. at 300.
49. See notes 38 & 39 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
51. 447 F.2d at 300-01. See also text accompanying note 57 infra.
52. No. C-70 104 SAW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3,1972), summarized at 2 CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 16,402.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1970).
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trict court found that a formal hearing before a rent increase was
too cumbersome and would unduly burden the subsidized housing
program without affording the tenant much added protection. 4
Nonetheless, it held that because great harm and possible eviction
for the inability to pay could result because of a rent increase,
elementary notions of due process required that tenants be given (1)
notice of the application for FHA approval of the proposed rent
increase, including a brief description of the reasons given by the
landlord for the increase; (2) an opportunity to make a written
objection to the increase; and (3) a concise statement of FHA's
reasons for approving the rent increase.5 5 This holding conflicts with
Hahn and extends Langevin so as to give a section 221(d) (3) tenant
who is faced with a rent increase some due process protection.
With this division of authority in mind, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided Burr v. New Rochelle Mu-
nicipal Housing Authority." The Burr court reasoned that in
Langevin the second circuit had refused to hold the actions of a
publicly subsidized private owner as taken under color of state law,
and, therefore, a hearing was not required; and, further, that the
Langevin court left no doubt that had the landlord been a public
body, the decision would have been otherwise. Moreover, the court
held that since the case involved a public body, the Langevin ration-
ale dictated that a hearing be required.57 The court then held that
the tenants had a right under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to notice and a formal adversary hearing before
being required by the New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority
to pay higher rents or an across-the-board service charge.5
54. Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, C-
70 104 SAW, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 1972).
55. Id. at 5; accord, Keller v. Maremount Foundation, No. C-71 1585
RFP (N.D. Cal. June 16, 1972), summarized at 2 CCH POVERTY L.
REP. 1 16,403.
56. 347 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
57. Id. at 1205.
58. Id. at 1206. A formal adversary hearing, also referred to as a trial-
type hearing requires: (1) timely and adequate notice and reasons for the
hearing; (2) opportunity to present evidence; (3) opportunity to present
written or oral argument or both; (4) disclosure of evidence against you;
(5) right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (6) a deter-
[Vol. II
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in modifying the
lower court's judgment, held that due process does not require a
formal adversary-type hearing before the imposition of a general
rent increase or service charge." While acknowledging the import-
ance of the tenants' interest, the court held that the tenants could
be adequately protected through a less formal procedure.' This
would entitle the tenants to notice well in advance of a proposed
rent increase, an opportunity to file written objections, the right to
submit any material relevant to the rent increase, and a statement
from the Reviewing Board outlining the reasons for its decision.'
The court's reasoning can be traced to three principal factors: the
official actions of the Housing Authority were actions taken under
color of state law; 2 the interest at stake was substantial and of such
a nature as to be within the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment;': and since the decision to raise rents turns on the resolution
of legislative as opposed to adjudicative facts, an adversary hearing
would be both burdensome and unnecessary. "
The significance of Burr lies in the fact that it is the first appellate
holding mandating that public housing tenants be accorded certain
due process protections before the promulgation of an across-the-
mination on the record. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.01, at 157
(1972).
59. 479 F.2d at 1169.
60. Id. at 1170.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1167.
63. Id. at 1167-68. At this point the court quoted from its earlier deci-
sion of Escalera v. New York City Housing Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 864 (2d
Cir. 1970). "ITIhe small size of the 'additional' rent charges [cannot] be
relied on to deny tenants automatically fair procedures. To be sure, the size
of the charges is relevant to the question of the burdensomeness of the
required procedures, but even small charges can have great impact on the
budgets of public housing tenants, who are by hypothesis below a certain
economic level." Id. at 1168. See also text accompanying note 25 supra.
64. 479 F.2d at 1168. The court continued, "[s]ome five hundred
tenants are directly involved in the imposition of the service charge by the
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority and tenant representation at
an adversary hearing would be difficult but perhaps not impossible. .. ."
NOTES19741
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board rent increase."5 There remain, however, certain ambiguities
and unanswered questions. The first is whether the procedure set
down by the court adequately protects the tenants' due process
rights under the circumstances."
The second circuit held that the tenants were entitled to a state-
ment by the "reviewing board" outlining the board's reasons for
either approving or rejecting the rent increase. 7 This implies that
the ultimate decision regarding the increase rests with the "review-
ing board."", However, the board does not fix the rents. The board's
only function is to review appeals by tenants who have been found
ineligible for admission to, or continued occupancy in, housing pro-
jects.'" Therefore, the Burr decision, which mandates that the re-
viewing board advise tenants of the reasons for the approval or
disapproval of a rent increase, may be inappropriate since that
board has no power over rents.'"
Assuming the inappropriateness of referring rent increase ques-
tions to the board, another question which arises is whether the
procedural protections mandated by Burr meet with the require-
65. "We must consider the effect of our decision in other areas. The
New York City Housing Authority, for example, operates 188 housing pro-
jects, housing approximately 600,000 persons in 155,610 apartments. A full
adversary hearing in such a situation with all attendent procedures would
present the most serious difficulties. The virtual impossibility of setting up
an equitable scheme for the representation of 155,000 tenant families in
New York is apparent." Id. It is interesting to note that the New York City
Housing Authority filed an amicus curiae brief arguing for the defendant's
position in the instant case on appeal.
66. Id. at 1169.
67. See note 61 supra.
68. The rules and regulations of the Housing Authority establishes
these Boards and provides: "all housing authorities, except the New York
City Housing Authority shall establish and [sic] authority board of re-
view, hereinafter referred to as the board. The board shall consist of at
least three members of the authority and be appointed by the chairman
of the authority." 9 NYCRR § 1627-7.3(a) (1963). However, since the
board is composed of authority members there is a strong implication of
partiality. This is mitigated by the board's limited functions. See note 69
infra and accompanying text.
69. 9 NYCRR § 1627-7.3(b) (1963).
70. See note 69 supra.
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ments of Goldberg. In Goldberg the Supreme Court held that be-
fore welfare benefits could be terminated an adversary-type hearing
was required7 where there was a finding, by an administrative
agency, that the individual had failed to take certain actions.72 Burr,
on the other hand, did not turn on the actions of an individual.
Moreover, while the rent increase would affect all tenants in the
public housing project individually-to the extent that each tenant
would have to pay any rent increase-the increase was not precipi-
tated by an individual's actions. Therefore, legislative and not adju-
dicative facts were involved in Burr. In addition, affording a hearing
to all tenants prior to a rent increase would be extremely burden-
some. In Goldberg, on the other hand, a hearing was required when
the actions of the individual resulted in his being deprived of a
benefit. Such a hearing was not required when the acts of the agency
affected all persons uniformly. Thus, the administrative burden in
Goldberg was, arguably, less onerous than it would be in the Burr
situation were a full adversary hearing required. Further, when the
interest involved in Burr, not paying increased rent, is compared
with that in Goldberg, it is clear that the Burr interest is less sub-
stantial. Thus, applying the Goldberg balancing test, i.e., balancing
the private interest against the public interest in a speedy determi-
nation, it is clear that the latter is superior.
While Burr has expanded the requirement of due process into new
areas," the decision leaves certain questions unanswered. Such
questions as the possible extensions of due process requirements to
service reductions, parking fees, and other areas will have to be
71. 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970).
72. Id. at 256 n.2.
73. In Hahn, the first circuit held that a section 221(d)(3) tenant need
not be afforded a hearing before the imposition of a rent increase. In
Langevin, the second circuit also held that a section 221(d)(3) tenant need
not be accorded due process protections before the promulgation of a rent
increase. In Geneva Towers, a California district court held that a section
221(d)(3) tenant must be given some due process safeguards before a rent
increase is imposed. In Burr, a New York district court held that a tenant
in a public housing project must be granted full due process protections
before the promulgation of a rent increase. In Burr, the second circuit held
that certain due process protections must be given the public housing
tenant before the imposition of a rent increase.
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dealt with in the future. However, Burr is one more step on the road
to the granting of limited due process in all areas of public and
perhaps federally subsidized housing.
CIVIL RIGHTS -Discrimination in Placement of Low-Rent
Housing-Statute's Requirement that Locality's Governing
Body Agree to Cooperate with HUD Used as a Shield to Protect
Suburbs from Integration by Low Income Blacks. Mahaley v.
Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1245
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (Mahaley I); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (Mahaley
Ii).
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of
the National Housing Act' which require a community to consent
to the construction of federally assisted low income housing within
its borders. They alleged that the consent requirement perpetuated
segregated housing patterns by giving white suburbs the power to
bar the construction of low income housing in their area, thereby
limiting such housing to predominantly black areas in urban cen-
ters.2 Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that if the statute was consti-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(b) (1970) provides in part: "IT]he Authority
shall not make any contract for loans (other than preliminary loans) or for
annual contributions pursuant to this chapter with respect to any low-rent
housing project initiated after March 1, 1949, (i) unless the governing body
of the locality involved has entered into an agreement with the public
housing agency providing for the local cooperation required by the Author-
ity pursuant to this chapter." As was said in Cole v. Housing Auth., 312
F. Supp. 692, (D.R.I. 1970): "42 U.S.C. § 1401 establishes the policy
objectives of the federal low-rent housing laws. Additionally, § 1401 states
the general policy to permit maximum authority to local agencies in the
administration of low-rent housing. Certainly, § 1401 seeks to preserve
broad powers of control, consistent with the statute, in local authorities in
order to carry out cooperative federalism, one of the underlying philoso-
phies of the statute." Id. at 695-96. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.27
et seq. (Page 1970) for a description of Ohio metropolitan housing authori-
ties. "CMHA has sought Cooperation Agreements with all of Cleveland's
suburbs but has received no positive response. The City of Cleveland
signed Cooperation Agreements in 1937, 1941, 1949 and most recently in
1971. These agreements authorized CMHA to build a total of 14,000 units
in Cleveland." Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth., 355 F. Supp.
1257, 1260-61 (N.D. Ohio 1973). An attempt by the City of Cleveland to
cancel the cooperation agreement of 1971 was held void in Cuyahoga Met.
Housing Auth. v. Harmody, 474 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1973).
2. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1245, 1247
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (three judge court).
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tutional, it was being applied with discriminatory effect. Plaintiffs
further contended that in specific instances localities had refused to
enter into cooperation agreements with the public housing
authority:' thus barring the construction of federally assisted low
income housing in their communities.4 They also alleged that the
cooperation agreement entered into between the City of Cleveland
and the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) was
inadequate because it did not provide for sufficient low income
housing construction to meet the needs of the City.5 They asked that
a new agreement be reached which would better reflect low income
housing needs.'
The challenge to the constitutionality of the statute was heard by
a three-judge federal district court.' Plaintiffs argued that the stat-
ute interfered with the right to travel and was an unlawful delega-
tion under the fifth, thirteenth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution.' The court rejected these contentions9 and held the
consent requirement constitutional even though the suburbs had
manipulated it to prevent integration by low income blacks."' The
panel then remanded the case to a single judge for a ruling on the
claim that local communities were using the provision of the statute
for discriminatory purposes." On remand, the court held that, ab-
sent a rational basis, suburbs which failed to enter into cooperation
agreements were perpetuating segregated housing patterns through-
3. The defendants were the board members of the Cuyahoga Metropol-
itan Housing Authority (CMHA), a public corporation authorized to en-
gage in the development and administration of low-rent housing in all of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, except Chagrin Falls Township; the City of
Cleveland; the suburban cities of Euclid, Garfield Heights, Parma, Solon
and Westlake which are municipal corporations in Cuyahoga County;
and the Department of Housing & Urban Development of the United
States (HUD), which administers the federal low-rent housing laws. Id. at
1246-47.
4. 355 F. Supp. at 1247.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1970).
8. 355 F. Supp. at 1247.
9. Id. at 1248 n.1.
10. Id. at 1250.
11. Id. at 1250-51.
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out the metropolitan area and were violating the thirteenth amend-
ment, the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, various civil rights acts including the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 and 1968,12 the United States Housing Act of 1937,1 and
regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).'4 The court ordered the CMHA to prepare a plan within 90
days setting forth the number of scattered site units to be placed in
each of the defendant suburbs. Objections and counter proposals
were to be made within 90 days of submission of the plan. Unless
the objections were constitutionally permissible the court would
have no alternative but to conclude that the objections were racially
motivated and appropriate judicial action would be undertaken.'
Under the Housing Act,' HUD may provide federal assistance for
the acquisition or construction of low-rent housing to meet unsatis-
fied housing needs upon the application of a local public housing
agency'7 which has concluded that "there is a need for such low-rent
housing which is not being met by private enterprise."'" HUD is
authorized to make loans "to public housing agencies to assist the
development, acquisition, or administration of low-rent housing or
slum-clearance projects by such agencies."' 9 In enacting the Hous-
ing Act of 1949,1 Congress expressly conditioned the receipt of fed-
eral assistance upon the local public housing agency entering into a
cooperation agreement with the governing body of the locality in
which low-rent housing was to be situated.' These agreements in-
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 2000d, 3601 et seq. (1970).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970).
14. HUD Site Selection Criteria, 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.700-710 (1973).
15. 355 F. Supp. at 1269.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 1415(7)(a) (1970).
19. Id. § 1409 (1970).
20. Id. § 1401 et seq. (1970).
21. Id. § 1415(7)(b)(i) (1970). "This bill [Housing Act of 1949] . ..
is based upon the firm foundation that, although the housing problem is
obviously national in scope, it is fundamentally a local problem, and that
the first responsibility for its solution therefore rests with the local com-
munity . . . .This bill fully incorporates the basic philosophy that, if the
people of a local community take no interest in that community's housing
problems, it is not for the Federal Government to impose a program upon
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sured that federally assisted housing would be exempt from state
and local taxes22 and that the new dwellings would result in the
elimination or amelioration of unsafe or insanitary housing in the
locality. 2':
Congress established a national housing policy in the United
States Housing Act of 1937:
It is ... the policy of the United States ... to assist the several States and
their political subdivisions . . to remedy the unsafe and insanitary housing
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income . . . that are injurious to the health, safety, and
morals of the citizens of the Nation.2 '
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes discrimination in
them." 2 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE 1550-51, 81 Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949). "Cooperation agreement. A contract between a Local Authority
and the governing body of the locality, providing for tax exemption, elimi-
nation of unsafe and insanitary dwelling units, supplying of public serv-
ices, and other forms of cooperation by the local government, and for
payments in lieu of taxes by the Local Authority, in connection with a low-
rent housing project." 24 C.F.R. § 275.1(f) (1973). The CMHA has the
power to "clear, plan and rebuild slum areas . . . or to provide safe and
sanitary housing accommodations to families of low income .... " OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.31 (Page 1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.34 (Page
1970). In place of taxes the housing project pays 10 per cent of its shelter
rents to the taxing authority. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(h) (1970). The public
housing projects must, under federal statute, pay the municipality for all
services at the same rate as private housing projects. Id. § 1410(i).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). "Those federally-assisted housing pro-
grams which are not for low income persons do not require a local approval.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709(b), (h), (i), (m); 1715e, 17151, 1715m, 1715n,
u, y, z, z-1; and 1713 (federal homeowner mortgage insurance and mort-
gage subsidy programs); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (loans for housing for elderly
and handicapped); 38 U.S.C. §§ 801, 1810, 1811 (housing subsidies for
veterans). The federally-assisted housing programs for low income persons
require local approval or a cooperation agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(2)
(leased housing); P.L. 92-383, 86 Stat. 540 (rent supplement); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3304(b)(1) (city demonstration)." 355 F. Supp. at 1255 (Lambros, J.,
dissenting).
24. United States Housing Act of 1937 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
See Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth. v. Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
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programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance, includ-
ing public housing and urban renewal projects. 5 Discriminatory
acts can be penalized by a cut-off in federal funding. 6 Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196827 directs the Secretary of HUD to act
in an affirmative manner in furthering the policy of fair housing.26
A recent federal court decision summarized the progression of these
acts as follows:
Read together, the Housing Act of 1949 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and 1968 show a progression in the thinking of Congress as to what factors
significantly contributed to urban blight and what steps must be taken to
reverse the trend or to prevent the recurrence of such blight .... Whatever
were the most significant features of a workable program for community
improvement in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be nondisciminatory
in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to affirmatively promote fair
housing.2"
25. Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.
(1970) provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See Comment,
The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights
Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, 749.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
27. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
(1970). The Fair Housing Act of 1968 was enacted as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.
28. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides in part: "It is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States." Id. § 3601 (1970). "(d) The
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall. . .(5) administer the
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a
manner affirmatively to further the policies of this subchapter."
Id. § 3608(d)(5) (1970). See 24 C.F.R. § 100.1 (1973).
29. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970), quoted in 355
F. Supp. at 1262 (emphasis omitted). See Note, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 289
(1971). An excellent history of the issue of racial discrimination in public
housing site selection is found in Note, Racial Discrimination in Public
Housing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REV. 63 (1970). In it are listed the
criteria that HUD uses in selecting sites for public housing: "(1) The suita-
bility of the site in relation to the surrounding neighborhood and the city
plan. (2) The physical characteristics of the site. (3) The use of scattered
sites as opposed to the use of single sites. (4) The cost of the site itself and
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In Mahaley I the three-judge court held that the consent require-
ment did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."' A state created classification which is either unrea-
sonable or irrational violates the equal protection clause.3 More-
over, where a reasonable classification infringes upon a fundamental
constitutional right, a compelling governmental interest 32 must be
of the required site improvements. (5) The feasibility of relocating all site
occupants to standard housing, within their financial means, in reason-
ably convenient locations, and available on a nondiscriminatory basis. (6)
The suitability of the site from the standpoint of facilitating and further-
ing full compliance with the applicable provisions of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and agency regulations and requirements issued pur-
suant thereto." Id. at 69. After discussing the defenses that Local Hous-
ing Authorities [LHA] can use to avoid integration in housing site selec-
tion, the author concludes: "Cost, zoning, and local political review-the
same factors that lie at the heart of the system of constraints facing all
LHA's-are singled out by HUD regulation as satisfactory excuses for an
LHA's failure to achieve nondiscriminatory site selection. So long as an
LHA is provided with such a formidable excuse, the inevitable result will
be the perpetuation of de facto segregation in public housing site loca-
tion." Id. at 116. The cases in this note show the trend toward limiting
the defenses the local governing bodies can employ as a shield against
integration of housing by low income blacks.
30. 355 F. Supp. at 1248-50.
31. "In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the
law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests
of those who are disadvantaged by the classification." Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). "But the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). "The clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidi-
ous racial discrimination in the States." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1967). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). "[T]he standards of equal protection are met if a
classification, or a distinction among classes, has some reasonable basis."
Bauch v. New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 607, 237 N.E.2d 211, 214, 289
N.Y.S.2d 951, 955, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968).
32. "[Any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that
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shown.33 When a statute has a racially discriminatory effect, the
courts distinguish between racial motivation and legitimate nonra-
cial concerns.:4 In distinguishing between discriminatory intent and
discriminatory effect in the area of housing discrimination, at least
five circuits have held that if an act, though neutral on its face,
results in housing discrimination it violates the fourteenth amend-
ment unless it can be justified on reasonable nonracial grounds. 5 In
Mahaley I, the court noted that:
Equal protection, absent an invidious discrimination, requires only that a
Congressional enactment have some reasonable relation to a statutory objec-
tive or purpose. This statute is certainly not arbitrary, or capricious and has
right [fundamental right of interstate travel], unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
33. Cases where wealth has been held to be a suspect classification
include Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (prepayment of costs
in divorce actions); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(poll tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigents entitled
to counsel on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent defen-
dants entitle to free transcript). See Note, Low Income Housing in the
Suburbs: The Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 58
(1971). "The determination as to whether a statute is to be tested under
the strict scrutiny or traditional approach turns upon an examination of
the trait used as the basis of the classification, and the nature of the
interest affected by the classifying statute. If the classifying trait is one
deemed 'suspect' . . . or if the statute impinges upon a 'fundamental
interest' . . . then the statute is said to 'trigger' active review." Comment,
Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 605, 610 (1973).
34. 355 F. Supp. at 1251 (Lambros, J. dissenting).
35. 355 F. Supp. at 1249-52 (Lambros, J. dissenting). "If proof of a civil
right violation depends on an open statement by an official of an intent to
discriminate, the Fourteenth Amendment offers little solace to those seek-
ing its protection." Dailey v. Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 910 (6th
Cir. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawana, 318
F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla.
1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039, 1049 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th Cir. 1970).
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a rational basis. This consent requirement was provided to ensure that low-
rent housing would be coupled with the slum clearance provisions of the Act,
and to buttress the notion of cooperative federalism."
The court, citing Lindsey v. Normet,37 disagreed with plaintiffs'
contention that there is a fundamental right to housing outside the
inner city."9 In addition, the court held that the consent requirement
was not discriminatory on its face, and did not result in an invidious
discrimination based upon wealth."9 The court relied on James v.
Valtierra4" where an article of the California constitution which pro-
vided that "[nio low rent housing project shall hereafter be devel-
oped, constructed, or acquired. . . by any state public body ..
without the approval of a majority of those voting at a community
election was challenged.' The Supreme Court held that the proce-
dure for mandatory referenda, which were also required in Califor-
nia for the approval of other types of legislation, ensured democratic
decision making and did not violate the equal protection clause.2
36. 355 F. Supp. at 1249.
37. "We are unable to perceive in . ..[the Constitution] any consti-
tutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality ..
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
38. "To date the right [to housing outside the inner city] asserted here
has not been elevated to the level of a fundamental right." 355 F. Supp.
at 1250.
39. 355 F. Supp. at 1249. "An 'invidious' classification or trait is one
which combines, in greater or lesser degree and in varying proportions,
three qualities: (1) a general ill-suitedness to the advancement of any
proper governmental objective; (2) a high degree of adaptation to uses
which are oppressive in the sense of systematic and unfair devaluation,
through majority rule, of the claims of certain persons to nondiscrimi-
natory sharing in the benefits and burdens of social existence; (3) a potency
to injure through an effect of stigmatizing certain persons by implying
popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority or undeservingness. A
law requiring racial segregation epitomizes the idea of 'invidiousness.' "
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 20 (1969).
40. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). See Comment, James v. Valtierra: Housing
Discrimination by Referendum?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1971); Note, 1972
Wis. L. REV. 268; Note, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 790 (1971).
41. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1.
42. 402 U.S. at 143. "By the Housing Act of 1937 the Federal Govern-
ment has offered aid to state and local governments for the creation of low-
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The Court held that:
The Article requires referendum approval for any low-rent public housing
project, not only for projects which will be occupied by a racial minority. And
the record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral
on its face is in fact aimed at a'racial minority."3
Hunter v. Erickson44 involved an amendment to the city charter
of Akron, Ohio, which provided that any ordinance which regulates
the use, sale, or transfer of real property on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, or ancestry must first be approved by a
majority of the voters before becoming effective.4" The Supreme
Court concluded that the charter amendment contained an explic-
itly racial classification and placed special burdens on racial and
religious minorities within the governmental process by making it
more difficult for them to secure legislation on their behalf since
"the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority. The
majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a
referendum might be bothersome but no more than that.'"" The
Court concluded that the charter amendment failed to meet the "far
heavier burden of justification"4 imposed on racial classifications.
The James" court distinguished Hunter on the ground that the
Akron referendum placed "special burdens on racial minorities"49
while in James the referendum was necessary "for any low-rent
rent public housing. However, the federal legislation does not purport to
require that local governments accept this or to outlaw local referendums
on whether the aid should be accepted." Id. at 140.
43. Id. at 141. The Supreme Court opinion cited the case of Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, an Act of the Alabama
State Legislature altering the shape of the City of Tuskegee, Alabama,
from a square to an irregular 28-sided figure in order to eliminate all but
four or five of its 400 black voters was held to violate the fifteenth amend-
ment, which forbids a state to deprive any citizen of the right to vote
because of his race.
44. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
45. Id. at 389.
46. Id. at 391.
47. Id. at 392 quoting from McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194
(1964).
48. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
49. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969), quoted in, 402 U.S.
at 140.
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public housing project, not only for projects which will be occupied
by a racial minority." ' This reasoning indicates that while racial
classifications in housing are not valid, economic classifications are
permissible. In Mahaley the federal statute was held to constitute
an economic, not a racial, classification.
The court in Mahaley interpreted James as indicating "that
wealth, per se, is not a suspect classification in the context of the
constitutional examination of a provision relating to housing assis-
tance or welfare."51 If the statute had specifically provided that
blacks could not live in white neighborhoods, it would clearly be
unconstitutional, but "[t]he racial effect of this statute, if any, is
not caused by the statute itself but rather by municipal action or
inaction which may have used this provision as a shield to protect
its inhabitants from integration by low income Negroes."" Plaintiffs
had not shown a cause and effect relationship between the statute
and the fact that low income blacks did not live in the defendant
suburban cities. '
Having decided that section 1415(7)(b)(i) was not unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied, the three-judge court remanded the
case to a single district court judge for a ruling on the claim that
local communities were using the consent provisions of the statute
for discriminatory purposes,
5 4
50. 402 U.S. at 141.
51. 355 F. Supp. at 1249. For cases in which wealth was held to be a
suspect classification see note 33 supra. But see San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973): "[W]here wealth is
involved the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages."
52. 355 F. Supp. at 1250.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1250-51. Judge Lambros dissented from the decision to re-
mand the case to Chief Judge Battisti for his ruling as a single judge on
the claim of racial discrimination. He believed the dissolution of the three-
judge court was not justifiable either for reasons of judicial economy or the
orderly disposition of the case. Since the court had already heard the
evidence on the constitutionality of the statute and the claim of discrimi-
nation on the defendant's part, no time savings resulted from ruling on the
first while remanding the second. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 90
(1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 84, 85 (1960). He also stated his belief that the relief
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Several recent decisions have dealt with attempts to alleviate
segregation by the development of public housing. In Banks v.
Perk" a housing authority and its executive director in the City of
Cleveland were enjoined from planning any future public housing
in black neighborhoods. In Cleveland 90 percent of the families on
the waiting list for federally assisted public housing were black, a
fact which compelled the court to conclude that the failure of the
metropolitan housing authority to place new public housing units
in white neighborhoods constituted a violation of the federal public
housing and civil rights statutes since: "in the absence of any super-
vening necessity or compelling governmental interest, any munici-
pal action or inaction, overt, subtle or concealed, which perpetuates
or reasonably could perpetuate discrimination especially in public
housing, cannot be tolerated."" In Crow v. Brown"7 a county refused
to issue building permits for apartments when it was discovered that
the tracts, which had been legitimately zoned for the construction
of apartments, would be occupied by low income black tenants. The
district court concluded that in the absence of supervening necess-
ity, any county action or inaction, which perpetuated concentration
of blacks in compacted areas, or thwarted the correction of such
conditions, was a deprivation of equal protection." This finding was
requested could be granted upon a finding of discrimination without reach-
ing the question of the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 1251. The
practice of avoiding rulings on the constitutionality of a federal statute
where relief can reasonably be granted without reaching that question is
one consistently sanctioned by the Supreme Court. See Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 369 (1971).
55. 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.
1973).
56. 341 F. Supp. at 1180. As for the issue of discriminatory intent, the
court said, "As Mr. Justice Clark stated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority 'It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws that it was done in good faith.' " Id. at 1183 quoting from
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (citations omitted).
57. 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972).
58. 332 F. Supp. at 392. The court ordered that the building permits
be issued and that a program of balanced and dispersed public housing
throughout the city be developed and implemented. Id. at 395-96. "Taken
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affirmed by the court of appeals: "The record is clear that the
County officials denied building permits . . for the purpose and
foreseeable result of continuing the present pattern of racial segrega-
tion.""
In Kennedy Park Homes Association v. Lackawanna,"' a home
association and others brought a suit to compel the city to take all
necessary steps to allow the development of a low income housing
project on a certain location. The court of appeals upheld the dis-
trict court's finding of racial discrimination by city officials. After
steps were taken toward construction of a low income housing pro-
ject, the city council adopted a moratorium on new subdivisions,
and zoned certain land, including the proposed project's site, as
open space and park area, despite a contrary recommendation of a
planning expert. The court, after describing the past history of
Lackawanna's racial discrimination, stated:
This panoply of events indicates state action amounting to specific authori-
zation and continuous encouragement of racial discrimination, if not almost
complete racial segregation .... The plaintiffs sought to exercise their con-
stitutional right of "freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoy-
ment of property rights." The effect of Lackawanna's action was inescapably
adverse to the enjoyment of this right. In such circumstances the City must
show a compelling governmental interest in order to overcome a finding of
unconstitutionality. The City has failed to demonstrate an interest so com-
pelling."'
together and viewed in their historical context, the actions of the County
in resisting attempts designed to achieve the national housing policy of
balanced and dispersed public housing and failing to assist such attempts
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relief
from this violation of the constitutional and statutory rights of plaintiffs
[blacks on AHA waiting list] . . . must be granted by this court." Id. at
392. See HUD Site Selection Criteria, 24 C.F.R. § 200.700-710 (1973).
59. 457 F.2d at 790.
60. 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), af'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
61. 436 F.2d at 114 (citations omitted). Another facet of the problem
was presented in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Here the Su-
preme Court was concerned with what constitutes state involvement in
discrimination. The case involved an article of the California Constitution
prohibiting the state from denying the right of any person to decline to sell,
lease or rent his real property to such persons as he in his absolute discre-
tion chooses. The California Supreme Court held that "[t]he instant case
[Vol. II
These three cases demonstrate that municipal inaction which leads
to discrimination may violate the equal protection clause.
Manifestly, the cooperation agreement required by the federal
statute and at issue in Mahaley II might be "used" to perpetuate
segregated housing. Should a locality refuse to enter into such an
agreement arbitrarily or after a need for low income housing is
shown, new housing is blocked and segregation continued. In
Mahaley II the court construed the requirement to enter into a
cooperation agreement as mandatory once the need for low income
housing was determined. Moreover, where this need is known or
clearly present, suburbs will not be permitted to thwart national
housing policy "by ignoring the need or by making arbitrary deter-
minations to the contrary." 2 The court held that the suburbs, by
failing to enter into cooperation agreements, and by not presenting
a logical rationale for such inaction, had discriminated against
blacks and other low income persons thus perpetuating existing
racial segregation throughout the metropolitan area. "3 CMHA was
presents an undeniably analogous situation wherein the state . . . has
taken affirmative action . . . designed to make possible private discrimi-
natory practices which previously were legally restricted." Mulkey v. Reit-
man, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 541-42, 413 P.2d 825, 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 890
(1966). The Supreme Court agreed and held that this article would involve
the state in private racial discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.
387 U.S. at 378-79. The Court also sanctioned the criteria used by the
California court to examine the article; determining its " 'immediate
objective,' " its " 'ultimate effect' " and its " 'historical context and condi-
tions existing prior to its enactment.' " Id. at 373. The Court concluded:
"here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing
law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to
authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing mar-
ket." Id. at 380-81.
62. 355 F. Supp. at 1267. The court described the population distribu-
tion of Cuyahoga County as having "the racial shape of a donut, with the
Negroes in the hole and with mostly Whites occupying the ring." Id. at
1260. A need for low income housing clearly existed throughout Cuyahoga
County. As of November 30, 1971, there were 5,652 pending applications,
73 percent by blacks, to all CMHA housing units. Despite the clear need
in each community within the jurisdiction of CMHA, suburban officials
had largely ignored CMHA's requests to negotiate a Cooperation Agree-
ment. Id. at 1260-62.
63. 355 F. Supp. at 1267. They had acted contrary to the due process
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ordered to prepare a plan within 90 days setting forth the number
of scattered site units it intends to place in each of the defendant
suburbs. 4
The court concluded that unless the suburban cities' objections
to the CMHA housing plan "are constitutionally permissible and
meet the compelling interest test, there will be no alternative but
to conclude that the suburb's failure to sign a Cooperation Agree-
ment is for a constitutionally impermissible reason, to wit: racial
discrimination and appropriate judicial action will be under-
taken."", In using the phrase "compelling interest test," the court
was referring to plaintiffs' right to be free from discrimination not
to any fundamental right to housing outside the inner city.
The Mahaley decisions support the proposition that if a statute,
neutral on its face, is manipulated in a discriminatory manner it
may violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, and to the United States Housing Act of 1937
as amended, and regulations of the Department of Housing & Urban De-
velopment.
64. Id. at 1269. The court also held that while Cleveland had not used
the Cooperation Agreement requirement in a discriminatory manner, the
principles stated in its opinion would apply to its future actions. Id. at
1268. The court had considered issuing a declaration that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied, but concluded, rather, that it had been used
in such a way as to perpetuate discrimination. Id. CMHA was ordered to
prepare a housing plan, a remedy which was seen as "the only constitution-
ally permissible solution." Id. at 1269. Objections and counter-proposals
to the plan were to be submitted within 90 days of submission.
65. Id. at 1269. Thus, while the referendum procedure in housing was
upheld in James, where a state had a history of referendum decision mak-
ing, similar procedures used with the intention of preventing such housing
from being built would be "suspect." In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
145 (1971) Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion stated: "It is far too
late in the day to contend that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only
racial discrimination; and to me, singling out the poor to bear a burden
not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the values that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 145.
[Vol. II
CIVIL RIGHTS-Right to Treatment-Neither Due Process nor
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Guaran-
tees the "Right to Treatment" for Mentally Retarded Children
Confined in a State Institution Through Noncriminal Proce-
dures. Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
In a civil rights action' brought' on behalf of the residents of
Willowbrook State Hospital by their parents and guardians the
plaintiffs attacked the conditions and treatment offered by the hos-
pital as violative of due process and equal protection. They peti-
tioned the court "to require . . .programs . . . [to] raise the con-
ditions at Willowbrook . . . ." The court,4 in Association for Re-
tarded Children v. Rockefeller,5 refused to extend a right to treat-
ment6 to patients civilly committed to state hospitals, thereby fore-
stalling an extension of such rights to the retarded.
Willowbrook State Hospital, located on Staten Island, opened in
1951.1 The facility attracted public attention in January, 1972, when
the devasting effects of a year long-hiring freeze, compounded with
a high staff turn-over rate, made conditions so deplorable as to
attract the attention of the media.8 Actions challenging these condi-
1. Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
2. The action was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), against Nelson Rockefeller, individually and as
Governor of New York State, Alan Miller, M.D., individually and as a
Director of Willowbrook State School.
3. 357 F. Supp. 752, 755.
4. The case was heard by Judge Judd in the Eastern District of New
York.
5. 357 F. Supp. 752.
6. Id. at 758-61.
7. Id. at 755-56. The number of residents within the institution had
reached 6,200 by 1969, but had been reduced to 4,727 by the time of trial.
Id.
8. Geraldo Rivera of WABC-TV, New York, brought attention to the
plight of Willowbrook residents in a week long feature news report, later
expanded in G. RIVERA, WILLOWBROOK: A REPORT ON How IT IS AND WHY
IT DOESN'T HAVE To BE THAT WAY (1972) which was followed by special
reports on other metropolitan stations and in newspapers.
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tions were filed in March, 1972,1' and were later consolidated. De-
spite significant steps by the state to correct these conditions, "' the
court found" the conditions at Willowbrook inhumane and ordered
remedial steps taken. 2 The court refased, however, to recognize a
constitutional right to treatment. "
9. Two actions were filed separately under the civil rights statutes 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (t970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). The plaintiffs, alleging
a broad public interest in protecting the patients against irreparable in-
jury, sought a preliminary injunction against the infringement of the pa-
tient's constitutional rights. See Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127
(D.D.C.), appeal dismissed, sub noma. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970).
10. 357 F. Supp. at 756.
11. The court dismissed defendants' eleventh amendment challenge to
its jurisdiction. Under the eleventh amendment, a suit may not be brought
in a federal court by a citizen against a state without its consent. See
Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972). Although Judge Judd
recognized the eleventh amendment bar, he did not find it to be a "juris-
dictional impediment." 357 F. Supp. at 765. Apparently the court accepted
the plaintiffs' argument that "intolerable consequences far more devasta-
ting than the usual delay resulting from an abstention doctrine" would
result. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 25, Association for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Plaintiffs' Reply Brief]. See also Post Trial Memorandum of Law of
Plaintiffs at 20, 27-33, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Post Trial Memoranduml.
12. 357 F. Supp. at 758. The court implemented the institutional stan-
dards required by the American Association of Mentally Deficient
(A.A.M.D.) and rejected the more detailed standards prepared by the
Accreditation Council for Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(A.C.F.M.R. Standards), requested by the plaintiffs. At the time this case
was brought, only one private Arizona institution had met the A.C.F.M.R.
Standards.
13. Id. See also notes 56-57 infra and accompanying text. The right to
treatment had been recognized by several courts for convicts imprisoned
in mental hospitals. In Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
appeal after remand, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967), an appeal from the
denial of a habeas corpus petition by a petitioner confined to a mental
institution after criminal acquittal based on insanity, Judge Bazelon noted
that confinement without treatment might draw into question the consti-
tutionality of a penal statute which required commitment in all cases
where defendants were acquitted by reason of insanity. See also Haziel v.
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At the time the suit was brought, patients were civilly committed
to Willowbrook (and other state mental institutions) either volun-
tarily or involuntarily. Voluntary admission" was based on applica-
tion by the patient, his parents, or guardians, while involuntary
admission was based on certification by a court 5 or doctor." Civil
United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Anonymous v. Fish, 20 App. Div. 2d 395, 247
N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep't 1964). See notes 22-28 infra and accompanying
text. Three years ago, in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), additional relief mandated, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), a
federal district court in Alabama, in a major decision, extended a guaran-
teed right to treatment to those patients involuntarily committed to state
mental institutions in civil proceedings. Wyatt was a class action initiated
by guardians of patients confined at a state mental hospital and by certain
employees assigned to the hospital, seeking court relief for lack of effective
rights. Judge Johnson determined that the programs for treatment were
inadequate and deprived patients of their constitutional rights but
reserved decision for six months to afford the state officials an opportunity
to fully implement an adequate program. In a later ruling, the court man-
dated the implementation of standards which Judge Johnson set forth in
his first ruling. See also Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 151-55 (1972).
14. Law of April 11, 1961, ch. 504, § 14, [1961] N.Y. Laws 1697-98
(repealed 1972) which was applicable to the suit provided: "[Tihe direc-
tor of any State school . . .for the care and treatment of the mentally
defective . . .may receive and retain therein as a patient any person
suitable . . .who voluntarily makes written application . . .or if such
person be under eighteen . . .such written application shall be made by
the parent or legal guardian. . . . In the discretion of the director. . . such
person may be detained . . . sixty days . . .and thereafter until fifteen
days after receipt of notice in writing stating his intention to leave . ...
It shall be the duty of the department to examine such cases and determine
if the persons so admitted are suitable for continued detention on a volun-
tary basis . . . ." This section was replaced in part by N.Y. MENTAL HY-
GIENE LAW § 33.23 (McKinney Supp. 1973) which mandates annual review
of each patient's mental condition. See also id. §§ 33.15, -. 17, -.21, -. 25.
In the Post-trial Reply Memorandum for Plaintiff at 2-3, Association for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Reply Memorandum], the plaintiffs claim that only
27 percent of the present residents were admitted under the old section.
15. Law of April 11, 1961, ch. 504, § 16, [1961], N.Y. Laws 1699 (re-
pealed 1972), provided: 1. "A person alleged to be mentally defective, and
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commitment is to be distinguished from commitment under the
state penal law, where, after a court ordered-mental examination,
a defendant found to be incompetent to stand trial is committed to
a maximum security prison facility for the mentally ill. 7
The plaintiffs attempted to base the constitutional right to treat-
ment on the existence of state action in the commitment process
itself'. They sought to classify the vast majority of commitments as
• .. not in confinement on a criminal charge, may be certified to and
confined in any licensed private institution for the ...treatment of the
mentally defective, upon an order made by a judge of a court of record . .
or of a children's court, or a justice of the supreme court or may be, upon
a certificate made by two examining physicians or an examining physician
and a certified psychologist, accompanied by a petition . . . after a hearing
• . .certified to the jurisdiction of the department . . . and retained as a
patient in an institution . . . in the department designated by the commis-
sioner." Law of May 9, 1969, ch. 407, § 66, [19691 N.Y. Laws (repealed
1972), provided: "Any person with whom an alleged mentally defective
person may reside . . . or the nearest relative or friend . . or the commit-
tee of such persons, or an officer of any well-recognized charitable institu-
tion . . . or commissioner of public welfare . . .may apply for an
order. . . .[Sluch petition shall be accompanied by the certificate of the
examining physicians . . . ." For the current applicable statute see N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 33.33, -.35 (McKinney Supp. 1973). In Reply
Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2, it was alleged that nearly 40 percent of
the patients were committed by court order.
16. Law of April 11, 1961, ch. 504, § 15, [1961] N.Y. Laws 1698-99
(repealed 1972), provided: "The director . . . in charge of any state school
or facility . . . for the care and treatment of the mentally defective . . .
may receive and retain therein as a patient. . . on a petition . . . accom-
panied by a certificate executed by an examining physician or certified
psychologist. . . dated not more than six months before the date of admis-
sion. In the discretion of the director such person may be detained . ..
for a period of sixty days and thereafter until fifteen days after receipt of
notice in writing from such person or of any person in his behalf, of his
intention or desire to leave . . . .If the director . . .shall deem further
detention necessary, he shall so certify . . . to a judge of a court of record,
who may in his discretion . . . issue an order certifying such person to such
institution for care, custody and treatment." This section was replaced by
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 33.27, -.29, -.31 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
The plaintiffs claim that nearly 32 percent of the patients were confined
on one physician certificate. Reply Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2.
17. N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAW § 730.10-.70 (McKinney 1971).
NOTES
involuntary despite original admission data, thus allegedly mandat-
ing due process protection. Plaintiffs challenged admissions deline-
ated as voluntary' by'the mental hygiene laws and sought to limit
the category to truly voluntary admittants.1 The proposed redefini-
tions would require a pre-commitment hearing in many cases where
it is not presently required. The court noted that labelling a person
mentally retarded might cause harm to the person so labelled.2
Thus, when a child's interests in avoiding harm were not protected
in commitment proceedings, a nominally voluntary commitment
was, in reality, involuntary. However, the court concluded that to
guard against this harm a constitutional right to treatment was not
needed; rather, a hearing with procedural safeguards would suffice.
In certain cases, therefore, a court may find the appointment of a
guardian at law an appropriate means of preventing harm to the
child. Further, when such harm is possible, the court suggested that
a hearing be held. While not delineating the procedural rights to be
afforded at such a hearing, the court noted that "the full panoply
18. The plaintiffs allege that nearly 75 percent of the patients were
compelled by law to reside at Willowbrook. Reply Memorandum, supra
note 14, at 2. Among the voluntary residents, many are minors signed in
by their parents or guardians. Plaintiffs charged that some parents, after
voluntarily institutionalizing their minor children, have since moved or
abandoned them. In 1970 alone, Willowbrook had nearly 10 percent of its
mailing to parents and guardians returned or undelivered. Id. at 3.
19. Authorities have often questioned the characterization of admit-
tance under these procedures as truly voluntary. The overwhelming major-
ity of patients are either children or those who were institutionalized as
children with the consent of their parents. If the retardate is truly commit-
ted voluntarily, he could not seek a constitutional right to treatment predi-
cated upon deprivation of liberty because he would be free to go at any
time. The logic of such a proposition, of course, ignores the fact that
many of the retarded in institutions cannot live outside of the sheltered
environment and that the right to leave in this context is as illusory as in
the area of mental illness. See Murdock, supra note 13, at 155. See also
Reply Memorandum 2-4. In testimony received during the trial, plaintiffs
complained of retrogression instead of progress in their committed chil-
dren. They questioned whether institutionalization is indeed the proper or
best treatment for the mentally retarded. See Post Trial Memorandum 8-
16.
20. 357 F. Supp. at 762.
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of' criminal due process rights" do not extend to all cases at all
times.2
1
Prior decisions"2 have held that due process requires a hearing
prior to the revocation of a fundamental right." This hearing re-
quirement has been extended to prevent situations where a classifi-
cation of an individual might effectively result in some future
harm. 2 Thus, the safeguards of procedural due process do not com-
pel treatment, but prevent arbitrary classification and the harm
which flows therefrom. Procedural due process is, therefore, not a
basis for mandating a constitutional right to treatment. 5
Plaintiffs claimed that the state's failure to provide Willowbrook
residents2" with an education substantially equal to that given non-
institutionalized retarded children 7 created a suspect classification
21. Id.
22. Past case law mandated a hearing prior to either the exclusion of a
mentally retarded child from public school, or prior to a change in educa-
tional assignment. See Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299
(5th Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Association for Retarded Children v. Penn-
sylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub.
Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
23. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971). In this
case, the fundamental right was the loss of liberty through civil commit-
ment.
24. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), where the
Supreme Court mandated a hearing prior to any state classification which
tends to stigmatize a citizen.
25. The due process discussion failed to meet the question raised in its
most drastic form by the functionally borderline retardate. Assuming that
an absence of treatment would lead to, at best, no improvement, a failure
to treat in this situation would amount to indefinite, if not permanent
confinement. This arguably is a denial of liberty without due process.
26. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 20-21; Post Trial Mem-
orandum, supra note 11, at 179-87. Although defendants implied that the
per capita input for those residents attending Willowbrook school was
roughly equal to the amount allocated by the state in its special classes
for the handicapped, defendants conceded that fewer than one third of the
residents between the ages of 5 and 21 attend the Willowbrook School.
See Post Trial Memorandum 180.
27. Under N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4407 (McKinney 1970) a grant of up to
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within the meaning of the equal protection clause. 8 An order was
sought requiring the state officials at Willowbrook to conform to a
principle of fiscal neutrality and to allocate funds for the education
of each Willowbrook resident equal to the amount allocated for each
retarded child attending public schools.
In evaluating an equal protection challenge, a court must first
determine the nature of the right involved.' The importance of
education to enable an individual to participate meaningfully in
today's society has been recognized by courts since the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education."' Nevertheless, the right to education
$2000 is available toward school year tuition of the handicapped child at
an approved specialized private school. Defendants admitted to a budget
of $1350 per pupil per year for those residents who do attend school, of
which only $820 was spent during the regular school year. Reply
Memorandum, supra note 14, at 9-10. Plaintiffs also mentioned the inade-
quate amount spent per resident on health services as compared to the
amount spent for mentally ill children in a state hospital. Id. at 11-12.
Non-education of the handicapped poses even more of a threat, since
"Iwlithout a well planned and structured education, these children, un-
like others, may never learn." It proves costly not only to the child who
suffers "[ilrretrievable learning losses and emotional distress" but also
gives the parents the responsibility to furnish "alternative custodial or
educational arrangements" and necessitates the continued cost of institu-
tionalization for the state. Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforc-
ing the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 995, 1003-04 (1972).
28. Comment, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065, 1125-29 (1969). See also note 29 infra.
29. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 57,
107 (1973). Under this test, the court examines the right involved to deter-
mine whether it is fundamental. If held to be fundamental, then any
classification which results in a limitation or prohibition on the exercise
thereof by the members of the class, is held to be suspect and requires a
compelling justification. Thus, had education been considered fundamen-
tal, the classification resulting from the difference in the per pupil expendi-
ture might be subject to strict scrutiny. In any event, the failure of the
educational program at Willowbrook to meet the needs of the retardate,
while similar needs of noninstitutionalized retardates were met, would be
subject to strict scrutiny.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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has not been recognized' as fundamental by federal courts.2 In-
deed, the Supreme Court, in San Antonio Board of Education v.
Rodriguez,:" denied the inclusion of education among those rights
characterized as fundamental:
While acknowledging the importance of education in society, and its connec-
tion to the ability to exercise meaningfully the fundamental rights of free
speech and voting, these factors could not overcome the absence of any ex-
plicit constitutional recognition of a right to educationYu
Once a court has decided that a right is not fundamental, a state
is not required to show a compelling interest for classifying per-
sons. :', The state must, however, show a rational basis for its stat-
ute.3" Since the right to education is not fundamental, the court
considered whether the state's distinction between an institution-
alized and non-institutionalized retarded child was irrational,
thereby violating equal protection." The court held that given the
state's finite financial resources and budgetary considerations, the
classification was rational and no requirement of fiscal neutrality
was mandated.
Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' due process and equal
protection arguments, relief was granted to the Willowbrook pa-
tients on the theory of a right to protection from harm." While not
specifically identifying the source of this right, the court noted that:
The rights of Willowbrook residents may rest on the Eighth Amendment, the
31. Comment, Development in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1129 (1969). "Education . . .presents a more difficult task for
justification of active review. . . .[J]udicial competence to deal with the
complex problems that plague educational institutions is open to serious
question. Moreover the difficulties of giving effect to decisions in this area
are enormous.
32. In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971), a California court found education to be a fundamental interest.
Id. at 605-10, 487 P.2d 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 615-19.
33. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
34. Comment, supra note 29, at 111.
35. Comment, Development in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1076-77, 1087-88, 1127-29.
36. Id. at 1082-83.
37. 357 F. Supp. at 763-64.
38. Id. at 764.
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (based on irrational discrimination
between prisoners and innocent mentally retarded persons). It is not neces-
sary now to determine which source of rights is controlling."
Prior decisions indicate that improvements in living conditions
within prisons have been enforced by the constitutionally mandated
protection against cruel and unusual punishment,4' which is directly
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment." Similarly, in cases where treatment of prison-
ers adjudicated as mentally incompetent proved necessary, treat-
ment was mandated on eighth amendment grounds. 2
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-
36 (1878) which illustrates the Court's difficulty in defining with exactness
the extent of the protection from cruel and unusual punishment when
examining the treatment of prisoners. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th
Cir. 1968), restricted the use of the strap for disciplinary measures in an
Arkansas state prison since such punishment violated the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause. Punishment, such as the use of solitary cells, has
been banned in federal and state prisons. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica v.
Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483,
485 (8th Cir. 1965); Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463, 466 (8th Cir. 1965);
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Afflick, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
1972).
41. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The eighth amendment's guarantee
against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment has been held ap-
plicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968); Rob-
inson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962), and Mr. Justice Douglas's
concurring opinion, id. at 675; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 463 (1947); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) which held that
an untried defendant who had been committed as incompetent to stand
trial could only be held for a reasonable period to determine whether he
might attain competency within the foreseeable future, and any delay
would be violative of due process. See also McNeil v. Director of Patuxent
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), in which the Court, citing Jackson,
rejected the state's holding of a petitioner for an indefinite period for
"observation," and mandated that "[diuration of the confinement . . .
be strictly limited." See also Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 111 (D.C. Cir.
1967) which mandated some attempt be made to relate the detention to
the needs of the juvenile. Class actions have been brought for rehabilita-
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Although many cases" now pending in the courts have sought the
extension of a right to treatment" on various constitutional grounds,
few decisions have been reached." In the few cases dealing specifi-
cally with a constitutional right to treatment, the results have var-
ied. In Wyatt v. Stickney, " a federal district court in Alabama
tion programs for young people who are defined as "[persons] in need of
supervision" under N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 732 (McKinney 1963). See, e.g.,
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Matter of Lloyd,
33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1970); People ex rel.
Meltsner v. Follette, 32 App. Div. 2d 389, 302 N.Y.S.2d 624 (2d Dep't
1969); People ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 2d 178, 259
N.Y.S.2d 462 (4th Dep't 1965); Anonymous v. People, 20 App. Div. 2d 395,
247 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep't 1964). In Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 454-
55 (D.C. Cir. 1966), Judge Bazelon found a Congressionally created right
to treatment in the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 21-562 (1967), a statutory right to treatment not only to those
civilly committed to public mental institutions, but also for prisoners com-
mitted to mental institutions for the criminally insane, who may serve out
their prison terms without receiving the care necessary to make release
possible. See also Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake
v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
43. Cases presently pending, mandating a judicially enforced right to
treatment include Ricci v. Greenblatt, Civ. No. 72-469 F (M.D. Mass.,
Feb. 11, 1972); Welsh v. Likens, Civ. No. 4-72 C. 451 (D. Minn., April,
1972); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71 (1973); Saville v. Treadway, Civ.
No. 6969 (M.D. Tenn., Apr. 10, 1973).
44. In Katz, The Right to Treatment, An Enchanting Legal Fiction?
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755, 780 (1969), the author summarized the elements of'
a right to treatment as developed by the District of Columbia Circuit: "(1)
The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve him
but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so . . . (2) ITIhe effort
Imusti be to provide treatment which is adequate in light of present
knowledge, [though] the possibility of better treatment does not neces-
sarily prove that the one provided is unsuitable or inadequate. . . . (3)
lAldequate number of psychiatric personnel; (4) lltnitial and periodic
inquiries [must bel made into the needs and conditions of the patient
with a view to providing suitable treatment for him and that the program
provided is suited to his particular needs."
45. But see Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
additional relief mandated, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Burnham
v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
46. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
[Vol. II
NOTES
mandated a right to treatment for those mental patients civilly
committed, whether voluntarily or otherwise, in a state mental in-
stitution. In three rulings,47 the district court judge set minimally
acceptable treatment standards for Bryce Hospital, 9 a state institu-
tion, and later ordered the implementation of the standards" at
Parlow,11 a state institution for the mentally retarded. The court
held that:
IWheni patients . ..involuntarily committed through noncriminal proce-
dures and without the constitutional protections that are afforded defendants
in criminal proceedings. . . . [aire so committed for treatment purposes
they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to
improve his or her mental condition. . . .[Absent] adequate and effective
treatment ...the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where one
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense.""1
In Burnham v. Department of Public Health,2 a federal district
court in Georgia refused to extend a constitutional right to treat-
47. 325 F. Supp. at 781, determined that the programs of treatment at
the Alabama state mental hospitals were insufficient, but reserved ruling
to afford state officials six months in which to implement an adequate
treatment program. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) set the standards
to be implemented at the Alabama state mental hospitals. 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) extended the implementation of the court ordered
standards to Partlow, a state institution for the mentally retarded.
48. 325 F. Supp. at 781. Wyatt was the first case to define treatment
in terms of habilitation, rather than in medical terms. Habilitation in-
cludes the nature of living conditions within an institution, including med-
ication, diet, clothing, attendance by adequate staff, both in terms of
quality and numbers. See Murdock, supra note 13, at 153-55.
49. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Judge Johnson used standards
such as the American Psychiatric Association quantitative staff standards
as criteria for the adequacy of treatment. See note 12 supra. Where the
hospital failed to conform to the standards, Judge Johnson left open the
possibility of private damages to be paid to the neglected patients. See also
Note, 34 U. Pi'rr. L. REV. 79, 86 (1972).
50. 344 F. Supp. at 387. The court concluded that those patients who
are "civilly confined to public mental institutions" are entitled to the right
to appropriate care whether mentally ill or mentally retarded. Id. at 390.
51. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
52. 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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ment based on civil rights statutes. 3 The court held that, in the
absence of a federal statute mandating treatment standards, the
plaintiffs, former patients of a Georgia mental institution, had
failed to demonstrate a clear showing of deprivation of a federally
protected right. Essentially the court felt that there existed "multi-
ple adequate remedies at law available to the plaintiffs on an 'indi-
vidual' basis through which redress may be obtained."54 The court
indicated that a determination in individual cases might be the only
basis upon which the courts of Georgia could ascertain "whether
'treatment' or 'adequate care and treatment' is being afforded pa-
tients .. . ."I'
Although recognizing the alternative approaches which have been
applied in the right to treatment area, the court in Association for
Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, withheld"6 taking a decisive step.
Instead, limited relief guaranteeing Willowbrook patients protec-
tion against harm was ordered. The court, by the nature of the relief
ordered, defined freedom from harm as limited to physical care, i.e.,
" 'civilized standards of human decency' or the level of a 'tolerable
living environment.'"" However, the decision fails to indicate
where the right to protection from harm ends and the right to treat-
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
54. 349 F. Supp. at 1343.
55. Id.
56. While attempting to maintain a somewhat neutral stance in the
developing controversy surrounding the right to treatment, Judge Judd
noted that the Wyatt case, to some extent, was a joint effort on the part
of the Alabama state hospital administrators and employees to bring pres-
sure on the legislature. 357 F. Supp. at 760.
57. Id. at 765. This is apparent from the nature of the relief he provided
under the right to be free from harm. The relief afforded was limited to
physical improvements: "(1) A prohibition against seclusion . . . . (2)
Immediate hiring of additional ward attendants [to care for the patients]
... (3) Immediate hiring of at least 85 more nurses [to care for the
patientsl . . . . (4) Immediate hiring of 30 more physical therapy personel
[to administer care] . . . . (5) Immediate hiring of 15 additional physi-
cians [to administer care] . . . . (6) Immediate hiring of sufficient recrea-
tion staff . . . . (7) Immediate and continuing repair of all inoperable
toilets . . . . (8) Consummation within a reasonable time of a contract
with an accredited hospital. . . ... Id. at 768-69. Noticeably lacking is any
rehabilitation program.
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ment begins. Presumably, the right to treatment is a higher stan-
dard and would require training programs and the like to be imple-
mented.
It can be argued that the absence of programs which could lead
to the eventual release of at least some of the retardates is harmful
to these persons. Clearly, however, such harm was not recognized
by the court. In establishing what the court determined to be ac-
ceptable conditions, particularly in terms of staffing within Willow-
brook, the court neglected to detail the criteria used in formulating
its requirements. '" In light of this it would be difficult to determine
whether mere compliance with the staffing ratios would actually
accomplish a better living environment for the patients.
With time, the limited relief formulated by the court may prove
inadequate in securing freedom from harm. Alternatives used in
other cases might then prove appropriate. In Wyatt, the court ap-
pointed an independent administrator, a specialist within the area
of mental illness, to implement the court's order." When it was
shown that the defendant had not succeeded in fulfilling the court
order, more decisive action for insuring the defendant's cooperation
was taken."'
In Rockefeller, the court assumed" the initial responsibility of
supervising defendant's compliance with its order. "2 The success of
this approach will determine whether more drastic steps will be
needed to insure permanent improvement within the Willowbrook
institution.
58. Id.
59. 325 F. Supp. at 785-86.
60. 344 F. Supp. at 378.
61. 357 F. Supp. at 768.
62. The present decision has been clouded by a recent unpublished
court order indicating that Judge Judd has reserved decision on the equal
protection and right to treatment issues since neither had been litigated.
Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 72 Civ. 356-357
(E.D.N.Y., May 12, 1973).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Blockbusting-Antiblockbusting
Section of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 Held not Violative of First
Amendment. Finding of "Group Pattern or Practice" Does Not
Require a Showing of Conspiracy or Concerted Action. United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
The Attorney General brought an action against Bobby L. Lawr-
ence, president of Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. and four other real
estate brokers in Atlanta, Georgia to enjoin alleged violations of the
anti-blockbusting provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.' The
complaint stated that the defendants had individually and collec-
tively engaged in a pattern or practice to prevent the enjoyment of
rights granted by the Act, and that a group of persons had been
denied rights secured by the Act, raising an issue of general public
importance. Defendants' agents allegedly had made unlawful repre-
sentations to white homeowners concerning changes in the racial
composition of their neighborhood in order to induce sales.2
The district court denied pre-trial motions by Lawrence and his
co-defendants for summary judgment. :' Prior to trial, consent judg-
ments were entered against two of the defendants and the action
was dismissed agains a third. At trial the district court found that
1. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970) states: "As made applicable by section 3603
of this title and except as exempted by sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this
title, it shall be unlawful- (e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce
any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the
entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of
a particular race, color, religion, or national origin." See generally 1968
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1837; Dubofsky, Fair
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149
(1969); Comment, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733, for a discussion of the
legislative history and provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970).
2. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 117 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
3. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487 (N.D.
Ga. 1971); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
and United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870 (N.D.
Ga. 1970).
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the representations in question were sufficient to constitute a
"group pattern or practice" prohibited by the Act, and that the
Attorney General had standing to bring the action.'
Only Lawrence appealed from the decision of the district court.
He argued that section 3604(e) was unconstitutional under the first
amendment, that the Attorney General lacked standing to maintain
the action, and that the injunctive relief granted by the district
court was improper. ' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Act did not contravene the first amend-
ment and that the Attorney General had standing because there
existed a "group pattern or practice" in violation of the Act. The
court also found the Act within the powers granted to Congress by
the thirteenth amendment.'
Blockbusting is the practice of attempting to induce white home-
owners to sell their homes by instilling in them fear that their neigh-
borhood is undergoing a change in its racial composition which will
depress property values and result in a general deterioration of the
neighborhood.' The classic pattern is for a speculator to buy up
4. United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
The court found that defendant's agents acted in "concert" such being
necessary to establish a group pattern or practice. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 3613
(1970) provides: "Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or
practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by
this subchapter, or that any group of persons has been denied any of the
rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general
public importance, he may bring a civil action in any appropriate United
States district court by filing with it a complaint setting forth the facts and
requesting such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order against the per-
son or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of rights,
as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted
by this subchapter."
5. 474 F.2d at 119.
6. Id. at 127.
7. See Note, 59 GEO. L.J. 170 (1970), citing Summer v. Teaneck, 53
N.J. 548, 551, 251 A.2d 761, 762 (1969); Contract Buyers League v. F & F
Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th
Cir. 1970); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 533, 224
N.E.2d 793, 797 (1967) for definitions of blockbusting.
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homes in the panicked area at below-market prices and resell them
to blacks or other minority group members at greatly inflated
prices.' The white seller is injured by being frightened into selling
at an artificially low price; the black buyer is injured by paying
more than the fair market value; and the public is injured by the
resentment which blockbusting engenders in both blacks and
whites." In Bob Lawrence white homeowners were induced to sell
their homes by brokers who then acted as agents for the sellers.
Profit results from numerous sales commissions earned as the neigh-
borhood undergoes rapid change."'
Nonstatutory techniques to curb these practices have proven inef-
fective." States have attempted to abate blockbusting by directly
prohibiting those types of representations usually made by block-
busters," by forbidding fraudulent representations to induce sales
8. Note, 59 GEO. L.J. 170 (1970). See also Vitchek, Confessions of a
Blockbuster, SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 14, 1962, p. 15; and Glassberg,
Legal Control of Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 145 [hereinafter cited
as Glassberg] for a description of how blockbusters operate.
9. Note, 59 GEO. L.J. 170 (1970). See generally Comment, 7 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 538 (1971) for a discussion of the dynamics of block-
busting and its effects on both white sellers and black buyers; and Glass-
berg, supra note 8, at 148-52 which explores reasons for controlling block-
busting.
10. Note, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 171 (1970); Glassberg, supra note 8, at 147-
48.
11. See Note, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 171-172 (1970) which points out that
membership in real estate associations which enforce a code of ethics is
voluntary and not a prerequisite to doing business and that self policing
efforts by these associations have been ineffective. The note also describes
neighborhood associations formed to fight against blockbusting. They are,
however, limited to an educational function since they cannot control their
members. Whether the tactics of these organizations prove successful will
depend on the fortitude of the blockbuster, yet in light of 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970) they would now appear unnecessary.
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02(H)(9) (Page Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22(2m) (1973),
all of which provide for criminal sanctions but do not require that the
representations be made for profit. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1016(e) (Supp.
1972), however, includes a "for profit" provision; and MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
112, § 87AAA(K) (Supp. 1972) provides only for suspension or revocation
of a salesman's or broker's license.
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or obtain listings,'" by regulations resulting in loss or suspension of
real estate licenses," and by setting up human relations commis-
sions with the power to investigate reports of blockbusting. 5 Locali-
ties have enacted ordinances designed to eliminate blockbusting
such as by regulating the size and location of "For Sale" and "Sold"
signs (the use of these signs is one of the blockbuster's panic-
inducing weapons)," and by requiring a permit to conduct door to
door solicitation. 7 A local ordinance which directly forbade block-
busting representations has been upheld.'
Private parties have also sought remedies against blockbusting
activities. In Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment,"9 black
13. V'r. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2295 (Supp. 1973).
14. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(3) (McKinney 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. §§ 20-320(11), 20-328 (1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1408 (1968); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 45:15-1 et seq. (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 440 (Pur-
don's 1968).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 956-57 (Purdon's 1964).
16. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 753-F (1962); Teaneck, N.J., Ordinance
1157 (1962) both of which are reproduced in 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1260, 1262
(1962). See also Barrick Realty, Inc. v. Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind.
1973) where an ordinance prohibiting display of a "For Sale" sign on prem-
ises in a residential area was upheld as a reasonable way to prevent block-
busting. But cf. People v. Diamond, 71 Misc. 2d 311, 335 N.Y.S.2d 711
(Long Beach City Ct. 1972) where such an ordinance was held unconstitu-
tional.
17. See Summer v. Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761 (1969) where
the valdity of a Teaneck, New Jersey regulation was upheld. See text
accompanying note 7 supra. See also Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1432, 1435
(1970). In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1961) the Court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting door to door solicitation without invitation. New
York City has empowered the Commission for Human Rights to declare
neighborhoods "non-solicitation" areas for one year periods, subject to
extensions. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 493, §§ C1-4.0, C1-5.0
(1970). Such a statute was held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Tibbitts, 42 U.S.L.W. 2224 (Oct. 30, 1973). A discussion
of New York attempts to fight blockbusting and a good analysis of the
"non-solicitation" area appears in Comment, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
538 (1971).
18. Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793
(1967), also discussed in Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1435-36 (1970).
19. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Il. 1969), noted in 80 YALE L.J. 516 (1970).
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buyers brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 19822) claiming, inter
alia, that defendants conspired to sell real property to plaintiffs at
higher prices than would have been charged to whites. Their com-
plaint alleged that the defendants engaged in blockbusting by initi-
ating and encouraging rumors that blacks were about to move into
the neighborhood, property values would fall, and the neighborhood
would become unsafe for whites. The court held that plaintiffs had
a cause of action under section 1982, even though blockbusting and
discriminatory lending did not fall within the express terms of the
section.
2
'
Appellant's argument that Congress had no constitutional power
to enact section 3604(e) was rejected by the court on the grounds
that such authority flowed from section two of the thirteenth
amendment.22 The court relied on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., :' a
landmark in civil rights decisions. In Jones the Supreme Court held
that the Civil Rights Act of 186624 prohibited private as well as
public racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real property.2'"
Prior to Jones it was believed that the Act proscribed only racial
discrimination which arose through "state action."2 Jones made it
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property." See the discussion of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) at notes 23-30 infra and accompanying text. Jones
applied this section to private conduct. The district court in Contract
Buyer's League stated: "The Court [in Jones] thus understood Section
1982 as implementing the Thirteenth Amendment 'to assure that a dollar
in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the
hands of a white man.'" 300 F. Supp. at 215.
21. 300 F. Supp. at 215.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides: "Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. . . .Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation."
23. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
24. See note 20 supra.
25. In Jones the defendant allegedly refused to sell a house to the
petitioner solely because petitioner was a Negro. 392 U.S. at 412.
26. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed pursuant to section 2 of
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clear that congressional authority to pass the Act arose not from the
fourteenth but from the thirteenth amendment,27 thus eliminating
the need for any "state action." In holding that the thirteenth
amendment gave Congress this power, the Court stated:
The constitutional question in this case, therefore, comes to this: Does the
authority of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment "by appropriate
legislation" include the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisi-
tion of real and personal property? We think the answer to that question is
plainly yes. "By its own unaided force and effect" the Thirteenth Amend-
ment "abolished slavery, and established universal freedom." Whether or not
the Amendment itself did any more than that-a question not involved in
this case-it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of that Amendment
empowered Congress to do much more. For that clause clothed "Congress
with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and
incidents of slavery in the United States.""s
Although strongly criticized," the Jones doctrine has been ex-
the thirteenth amendment. Since it was feared that the Act may have been
unconstitutional it was reenacted in 1870 subsequent to enactment of the
fourteenth amendment. Consequently it was widely believed that the Act's
constitutionality rested on the fourteenth rather than the thirteenth
amendment. Therefore enforcement of the Act would only apply to "state
action" since such was a requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See
Comment, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 79 (1970); Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294
(1969); Comment, 23 MERCER L. REV. 519 (1972); Comment, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1024 (1972), dealing with § 1981 of the Act. The Jones decision
itself describes the development of this area. 392 U.S. at 422-44. That the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not reach con-
duct of private persons was reaffirmed in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966).
27. 392 U.S. at 436-37 where the Court stated: "But it certainly does
not follow that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or the subse-
quent readoption of the Civil Rights Act were meant somehow to limit its
application to state action. . . . [1]t would obviously make no sense to
assume, without any historical support whatever, that Congress made a
silent decision in 1870 to exempt private discrimination from the operation
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866" (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 438-39, quoting from Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
29. See Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Judicial Activism Run
Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485, 500-01 (1969), where the Court's view of the
history of the Act as well as its reading of the thirteenth amendment is
criticized; and 6 FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, HISTORY
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panded. : In Brown v. State Realty Co.,3' white homeowners brought
an action against a real estate agency for a violation of section
3604(e), 12 claiming that defendants made unlawful representations
to induce sales of property. The court, citing Jones, held the Act
valid under the thirteenth amendment:
[Jones] seems to constitute a pre-approval of the Fair Housing Title of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, of which the 'blockbusting' provision is a part.3
In United States v. Mintzes,34 the Attorney General brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 3613 to enjoin violations of section
3604(e). The defendant real estate agency had attempted to induce
certain white homeowners to sell their property by representing that
an "undesirable element" was moving into the neighborhood. The
court, citing Jones and Brown granted injunctive relief and found
section 3604(e) constitutional under the thirteenth amendment.35
The court in Bob Lawrence also upheld the constitutionality of the
section:
We think that the mandate of Jones is clear. This Court will give great
deference, as indeed it must, to the congressional determination
that § 3604(e) will effectuate the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment by
aiding in the elimination of the "badges and incidents of slavery in the
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1257 (1971). For a criticism
with a different view, see Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294, 1321 (1969).
30. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), noted in Note, 40
FORm-HAM L. REV. 635 (1972); Note, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 168 (1971); Note,
46 TULANE L. REV. 822 (1972). See also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
31. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) gives a private cause of action to anyone
injured by a violation of the Fair Housing title of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.
33. 304 F. Supp. at 1240. In Jones, the Court expressly stated: "What-
ever else it may be, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing
law. . . . It does not refer explicitly to discrimination in financing arrange-
ments or in the provision of brokerage services." 392 U.S. at 413. The Court
went on to say: "Thus, although § 1982 contains none of the exemptions
that Congress included in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, it would be a serious
mistake to suppose that § 1982 in any way diminishes the significance of
the law recently enacted by Congress." Id. at 415.
34. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
35. Id. at 1312-13.
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United States. ... Appellants have failed to present any argument that
impugns the reasonableness of the congressional determination. Indeed, no
such argument can be made in light of the role that blockbusting plays in
creating and in perpetuating segregated housing patterns and thus in pre-
venting "a dollar in the hands of a Negro . .. [from purchasing] the same
thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man."'"
The appellant in Bob Lawrence also contended that section
3604(e) constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on free
speech in violation of the first amendment.:7 The fifth circuit re-
jected this contention on the grounds that the section regulates
conduct, not speech, and "any inhibiting effect [the Act] may have
upon speech is justified by the Government's interest in protecting
its citizens from discriminatory housing practices . . ." The
court went on to say, "Section 3604(e) regulates commercial activ-
ity, not speech. The statute is aimed at the commercial activities
of those who would profiteer off the ills of society, conduct that the
Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to regulate." :" The
court relied on United States v. O'Brien,"' where the Supreme Court
upheld petitioner's conviction for violating a federal statute by
burning his draft card in an expression of opposition to the Viet
Nam War. The court in Bob Lawrence concluded that section
3604(e) meets the criteria outlined by Chief Justice Warren in
O'Brien for the regulation of conduct which is only incidentally
speech:
[Gjovernment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."
Section 3604(e), enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment,'2
furthers the important governmental interest of "protecting . . .
36. 474 F.2d at 120-21.
37. Id. at 121.
38. Id., quoting from 313 F. Supp. at 872, a pre-trial Bob Lawrence
opinion.
39. 474 F.2d at 121.
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Id. at 377.
42. See notes 22-36 supra and accompanying text.
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citizens from discriminatory housing practices . . . . " Moreover,
the interest furthered is unrelated to speech and the incidental im-
pact thereon is no greater than essential to that interest. This analy-
sis assumes blockbusting to be a continuous process commencing
with the inducement to sell and followed by the sale by the home-
owner and the making of profit by the inducer.4 The sale itself is
not the conclusion of the process, but a means of furthering the
blockbusting practice. However, the situation in O'Brien is readily
distinguishable from that in Bob Lawrence. In O'Brien, the federal
statute prohibited conduct which incidentally was a form of speech,
albeit implied or symbolic speech. The statute involved in Bob
Lawrence prohibits speech which is part of a commercial activity.
This distinction does not undermine the decision in Bob Lawrence,
for it is the thrust of O'Brien which should be decisive. Clearly
Congress has the power, pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, to
regulate activity which imposes a badge or incident of slavery.45
With the enactment of section 3604(e) Congress found blockbusting
to be such an activity. Thus, where the activity is subject to regula-
tion and involves speech, Congress may establish such limitations
on speech necessary to effectuate the regulations. The court in Bob
43. 474 F.2d at 121 citing 313 F. Supp. at 872.
44. See the definition at text accompanying note 6 supra.
45. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
46. 474 F.2d at 120-21 (relying on Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 and Brown,
304 F. Supp. at 1240). There is, however, nothing in the legislative history
of the statute to justify this contention. See also note 1 supra. But the
court's conclusions may be supported by the following line of reasoning.
In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court construed
the thirteenth amendment to give Congress "power to pass all laws neces-
sary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States." Id. at 20. The Court in Jones upheld the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), as a valid exercise of Congress' thirteenth
amendment powers to abolish the badges and incidents of slavery. In
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1968), the Court indicated that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 should be read together with the "far more detailed
ICivil Rights] Act of 1968." Id. at 388. Thus, in Erickson the Court im-
plicitly holds that the findings and purposes of Congress in enacting 42
U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970) were based on thirteenth amendment considera-
tions, i.e., blockbusting imposes a badge or incident of slavery upon a
segment of society.
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Lawrence reached this conclusion by balancing the valid congres-
sional interest in eliminating badges and incidents of slavery
against first amendment rights. Its analysis is based on the assump-
tion that section 3604(e) regulates conduct and, therefore, is within
the conceptual limits of O'Brien.
To strengthen its "conduct" analysis, the court pointed to lan-
guage in the statute proscribing only those representations made for
profit. The court drew a distinction between speech uttered "for
profit" and that which is not. To support this position, cases up-
holding the regulation of commercial speech were cited.47 Under the
court's reasoning, speech uttered for profit loses its character as
speech and becomes conduct subject to regulation by Congress
where a valid governmental interest is present." Representations of
the type prohibited under section 3604(e) made for the purpose of
advocacy or social commentary would be protected by the first
amendment if not made for profit.4" Logically, therefore, any sup-
pression of speech must go no further than is necessary to achieve
the limited governmental purpose."'
47. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970);
Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972).
48. 474 F.2d at 122. The Court emphasized this change in character by
enclosing the word speech in quotation marks at this point in the opinion.
49. Id. at 121-22: "We think the court in United States v. Mintzes...
correctly analyzed the statute when it said: 'The words 'for profit,' as used
in section 3604(e) include the purchase of property by prohibited means
with the hope of selling it for a larger price, but the words are not limited
to such a transaction. They were evidently included in § 3604(e) to distin-
guish and eliminate from the operation of that subsection statements made
in social, political or other contexts, as distinguished from a commercial
context, where the person making the representations hopes to obtain some
financial gain as a result of the representations.' "Id., quoting 304 F. Supp.
at 1312.
50. The court in State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 291 A.2d 161 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1972), noted in 77 DICKINSON L. REV. 425 (1973), was presented
with a related issue. Here the statute under consideration prohibits block-
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To bolster its analysis the court cited United States v. Hunter5'
busting statements by a person "[w]hether or not acting for monetary
gain." The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found that the first
amendment is not violated because where speech is an integral part of
unlawful conduct it has no constitutional protection. The court cited Bob
Lawrence (the 1970 pre-trial opinion) and Chicago Real Estate Bd. for this
proposition. In Bob Lawrence, however, only speech made for profit is
being regulated while in Chicago Real Estate Bd., the ordinance limits
itself to representations made in the course of soliciting sales. The Mary-
land statute would also apply in a non-blockbusting situation and prohibit
a person from advising a neighbor to sell his home because of the entry of
blacks into the area. Thus, it constitutes a complete bar to making the
forbidden respresentations regardless of context. This seems to raise seri-
ous first amendment questions. The court in Brown also adopted this line
of reasoning when it stated, "Nor does the fact that contact with the agents
was initiated in some cases by the property owners or that the subject of
Negro purchasers was in some cases first raised by the property owners
change the result. The conduct condemned and the responsibility placed
by the statute on the agent is to refrain absolutely from any such represen-
tations." 304 F. Supp. at 1241. The court in Mintzes seemed to recognize
the issue: "The inclusion of statements made in social or political contexts
would have raised serious First Amendment problems. Similar problems
would arise if the Act were applied to an honest answer to a question put
by the owner of a dwelling." 304 F. Supp. at 1312. The Mintzes court cited
Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 App. Div. 2d 104, 267 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1st Dep't), aff'd,
18 N.Y.2d 619, 219 N.E.2d 287, 272 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1966), discussed in 34
A.L.R.3d 1438-39 (1970). The basis of Abel was the N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
art. 12A (McKinney 1968) which gives the Secretary of State the power to
regulate the granting of broker's licenses. These licenses may be revoked
by a showing of untrustworthiness on the part of the broker. In Able it was
contended that a violation of the regulation against blockbusting is a dem-
onstration of untrustworthiness. The Mintzes court cited Abel for the prop-
osition that "as long as the information given by the brokers to those
employing them 'is accurate and neither in content nor purpose seeks to
encourage racial bias as regards housing, it is unexceptionable.' " 304 F.
Supp. at 1312 n.3. This supports the assertion that an answer to a question
posed by a homeowner concerning the influx of a minority group into a
neighborhood would be outside the prohibition of the Act.
51. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) which
upheld the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970) which prohibits the pub-
lication of real estate advertisements that express a preference for or dis-
crimination against persons of any race, color, or religion. The defendant
in Hunter printed an advertisement for rooms in a "white home."
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for the proposition that purely commercial advertising is afforded
less first amendment protection than other forms of speech.2 It also
relied on Mintzes " to show that representations made "for profit"
are within a commercial, as opposed to a social, political, or other
context.5" However, merely because a statement is made in a com-
mercial context does not ipso facto deprive it of first amendment
protection."5 The major factor which determines whether speech in
a commercial context may be controlled is content. If the content
is political or artistic it will be fully protected regardless of the
context;5" but if the content is purely commercial, i.e. advocating
52. "It is now well settled that, while 'freedom of communicating infor-
mation and disseminating opinion' enjoys the fullest protection of the First
Amendment, 'the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government
as respects purely commercial advertising.' " 459 F.2d at 211-12, citing
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Banzhaf v.
F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969);
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
53. See notes 34-35, & 50 supra and accompanying text.
54. 474 F.2d at 122. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642: "[tlhe fact that peri-
odicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First
Amendment." In Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) the
Court upheld a conviction for using the mails to distribute obscene mate-
rial in violation of a federal statute. Justice Brennan writing for the major-
ity stated, "commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing
the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment." Id. at 474.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) the Court reversed the
holding in a libel case where a newspaper was found to be liable for printing
a political advertisement criticising a public official, stating, "[W]e hold
that if the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitution-
ally protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that protec-
tion because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement." Id.
at 266.
56. See cases cited in note 52 supra. See also Pittsburgh Press v.
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) for a comparison of the
holding in Valentine, supra note 52, with the Ginsburg and New York
Times cases, supra note 55. Compare Valentine with Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943), cited in Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d at 122.
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the purchase of goods or services, the speech may be regulated. 7 The
court apparently recognized this distinction when it described the
representations prohibited by section 3604(e) as "purely commercial
speech.""' The representations made by the blockbuster are com-
mercial in the sense that he is advocating that his services be used
to sell homes.
The line of precedent which allows regulation of purely commer-
cial speech concerns advertising exclusively;"9 however, cases which
have upheld the control of advertising have never totally prohibited
the dissemination of the commercial message."' Section 3604(e) pro-
hibits the forbidden representations for profit in any manner what-
soever, thus going far beyond what has previously been permissible
advertising regulation. Though section 3604(e) might not survive a
first amendment challenge attacking its total prohibition of a com-
mercial message, it might well subsist as a properly enacted control
of conduct. The speech involved may be suppressed as incidental to
the control of conduct, and there should be no need to justify further
this control by labelling the speech "commercial speech."
Appellant also attacked the standing of the Attorney General.
The Fair Housing title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 gives the
Attorney General standing to sue persons dealing in real property
for conduct violative of the Act where the dealer has engaged in an
individual pattern or practice of blockbusting, or where he has par-
57. 474 F.2d at 122.
58. Id. The court seems to be confused on this point because it admits
that the statements like those made by Lawrence may have had "informa-
tional value."
59. See note 52 supra.
60. In Valentine the handbill involved could have been printed in a
magazine or a newspaper; likewise, cigarette commercials may appear in
periodicals or on billboards despite the complete prohibition of cigarette
advertising on radio and television that was upheld in Capital
Broadcasting. In Breard the magazines which petitioner was prohibited
from selling door-to-door were available on the newstands and the sales
pitch could have been disseminated by mail or in any manner other than
door-to-door soliciation. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial
Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1191-96 (1965) where it was pointed out
that if no alternative means for learning about the availability of resi-
dences exist, at least for Negroes, the control of advertising means prohibi-
tion of content.
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ticipated with others in a group pattern or pactice of blockbusting.'
By tying the Attorney General's standing to a pattern or practice
violative of the Act, there is an implicit limitation on that standing.
Appellant's motion for summary judgment was denied because
questions of fact remained concerning the existence of coordinated
efforts by defendants to make the prohibited representations." If
the defendants, acting independently, had engaged in isolated
blockbusting activities the home owners would be left with their
private remedy under the Act." The lower court decided that for the
Attorney General to have standing a coincidence of similar individ-
ual section 3604(e) violations would not be sufficient; there would
have to be a pattern or practice on the part of the group acting
together through a showing of some coordination of effort, 4 since
"[any less standard would provide the Attorney General with en-
forcement powers over the isolated acts of individual defendants
acting independently of each other, merely because these persons'
acts coincide in time or place with the acts of other violators.""
In the companion lower court case, United States v. Mitchell,"
the court determined that "pattern or practice" does not mean acci-
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). See note 4 supra.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The Attorney General also is granted
standing whenever "any group of persons has been denied any of the rights
granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public
importance . . . ." The trial court held that there was insufficient evi-
dence to raise an issue of general public importance and that, in any event,
the individuals affected have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970). 335
F. Supp. at 1008. However, the court of appeals reversed stating: "The
District Court's specific finding that appellant had violated § 3604(e)
shows the denial of the rights of a group of persons, both black and white,
to be free from racial inducements to sell and from the results of such racial
inducements." 474 F.2d at 125 n.14. The court further indicated that it was
for the Attorney General, not the court, to determine when an issue of
general public importance justifying his intervention is raised. Id.
63. 42 U.SC. § 3612 (1970). See note 32 supra.
64. 327 F. Supp. at 493.
65. Id. at 492-93. The court pointed out that the legislative history gave
no guidance as to the meaning of the term. It styled its own view of the
interpretation of "group pattern or practice" as the "plain meaning" inter-
pretation.
66. 327 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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dental, unintentional, or unusual representations, but instead the
representations must be repeated, intentional and deliberate, and
usual. 7 At trial, the evidence was held insufficient to support a
finding of an individual pattern or practice by the defendants. How-
ever, the court did find that the defendant and non-defendant real
estate agents alike acted in concert and knowingly engaged in a
group pattern or practice thereby establishing "the necessary 'con-
cert' of action to allow the Attorney General to bring this
suit. .. "66
What constitutes an individual pattern or practice has been con-
sidered in non-blockbusting cases brought under various Civil
Rights Acts."' The most important of these was United States v.
Mayton.1' This case was brought for violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1971(e) which applies the phrase "pattern or practice" to
interference with voting rights. In Mayton, the court drew upon a
substantial body of legislative history concerning the meaning of the
phrase: "The words pattern or practice were not intended to be
words of art. No magic phrase need be said to set in train the remedy
provided in § 1971(e). Congress so understood them."'" Mayton's
interpretation of the phrase was accepted in the housing context in
67. Id. at 483. The court applied an objective test to the representa-
tions, i.e., how would they be understood from the point of view of a
reasonable man hearing them as to whether they were the type prohibited
by the Act. Id. at 479.
68. 335 F. Supp. at 1006. It was found that there were four representa-
tions by agents of Mitchell, two by agents of Stanley, and four by agents
of Lawrence.
69. Since the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 gave no
guidance as to the meaning of the term "pattern or practice" all of
the § 3613 cases have looked to the prior Civil Rights Acts which use the
same term, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970).
Those cases likewise hold that a pattern or practice must entail more than
an isolated or accidental incident. See generally United States v. Ironwork-
ers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971);
United States v. Gray, 315 F. Supp. 13 (D.R.I. 1970); United States v.
Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969); Dobbins v. Electrical Workers
Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 269 (1972) for a more extensive treatment of the meaning of the term
pattern or practice.
70. 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964).
71. Id. at 158.
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United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp.72 There "pattern or
practice" was held to mean more than isolated or accidental events.
However, the court did not imply that the number of incidents is
determinative, but rather, that each case must turn on its own
facts." Thus when the fifth circuit considered Bob Lawrence, a body
of law had developed dealing with individual patterns or practice.
However, the two other federal anti-blockbusting cases, Brown" and
Mintzes, 1 gave no guidance as to the meaning of "group pattern or
practice." The former was brought by private citizens under section
3612, and the latter found only an individual pattern or practice.
The trial court in Bob Lawrence held that a finding of a group
pattern or practice must rest on a "necessary concert" among the
real estate brokers."6 This seems to require some inter-broker knowl-
edge of similar action by others. Thus the argument that a group
pattern or practice could exist without such knowledge was rejected.
Inter-broker knowledge would apparently be required even though
homeowners in a neighborhood were exposed to numerous block-
busting representations from various individual brokers.
The court of appeals in Bob Lawrence reasserted the meaning of
individual pattern or practice advanced in West Peachtree." The
court acknowledged that while a single act by a broker does not
constitute an individual pattern or practice it may, under certain
circumstances, involve the individual in a group pattern or prac-
tice. 6 The court went on to state that:
72. 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971). This case concerned a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970), where defendant refused to rent apartments
in his building to blacks. The court found defendant's admission that his
prior policy of discrimination remained unchanged after passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 was sufficient to establish a pattern or practice of
discrimination.
73. Id. at 227.
74. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
76. 335 F. Supp. at 1006.
77. 474 F.2d at 123-24. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 123. "Unless we are to construe the phrase 'group of persons'
as totally superfluous, there is no need for each member of the 'group of
persons' to be engaged in an 'individual pattern or practice' of violating
the act before the Attorney General has standing to sue." Id.
NOTES
Blockbusting by its very nature does not. require concerted action or a con-
spiracy to wreak its pernicious damage ...... If there be any doubt as to
the meaning of the statute it is our function to construe the language of the
statute so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. . . ." JAI group pat-
tern or practice of blockbusting is established when a number of individuals
utilize methods which violate § 3604(e).11
Thus an isolated violation by one person would not establish a group
pattern or practice or confer standing on the Attorney General. If,
however, there is a group of violators, each committing one violation
without knowing that others are also violating the Act, a group
pattern or practice is established, and the Attorney General has
standing to sue." The trial court did not require a showing of con-
spiracy in order to establish a group pattern or practice. However,
the court of appeals went further when it eliminated the need for
showing a "concert of action" or knowledge on the part of the indi-
vidual defendants that others were engaging in the same activity.',
It appears that if Jones has any real meaning the finding is ines-
capable that Congress had the power to enact the Fair Housing title
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. But Bob Lawrence presents two very
79. Id. at 124, citing Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, Inc.,
399 F.2d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 1968).
80. The Court's decision expands the standing of the Attorney General
to sue. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972),
white apartment dwellers brought an action against the apartment owner
for refusing to rent to blacks in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
The court of appeals held that plaintiffs were not aggrieved persons and
therefore had no standing. The Supreme Court in reversing held that the
legislature intended for standing to be defined as broadly as possible in
private suits, and went on to state, "So far as federal agencies are con-
cerned only the Attorney General may sue; yet, as noted, he may sue only
to correct 'a pattern or practice' of housing discrimination. That phrase 'a
pattern or practice' creates some limiting factors in his authority which we
need not stop to analyze." 409 U.S. at 210.
81. A similar situation arises with the concept of combination and
conspiracy in the antitrust area. The cases require, in broad terms, some
knowledge or mental element on the part of the defendants. However,
similar conduct by various businessmen, i.e., conscious parallelism, is not
sufficient to support the agreement required for violation of the Sherman
Act. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962);
Note, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 75; Note, 57 CAL.. L. REV. 262 (1969).
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difficult issues which have not yet been adequately decided. The
first is the free speech problem arising from section 3604(e)'s direct
prohibition of certain representations made in the course of block-
busting. The court's analysis of the problem leaves much to be
desired and may well be subject to future challenge.
The second issue is the novel problem of defining "group pattern
or practice." In finding Lawrence subject to the provisions of the Act
even though he may have had no knowledge of the activities of other
real estate agents, the court was on firmer ground. The consequence
of this new interpretation is to close a very obvious loophole and
increase the likelihood that the congressional intent to eliminate
blockbusting and end all forms of racial discrimination in housing
will be achieved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sixth Amendment-Exclusion
from Jury Selection of Residents of the Judicial District where
a Crime is Committed Held Unconstitutional as a Denial of the
Right to a Jury from the Vicinage. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546,
510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
Defendant Leon Jones, a Negro, was arrested for selling mari-
juana' in the 77th Street Los Angeles Police Department Precinct,
and was brought to trial in the Southwest Superior Court District
Jones moved :' to transfer the trial to the Central Superior Court
District' of Los Angeles County on the ground that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments entitled him to be tried by a jury drawn
from the district where the crimes occurred, and whose members
would be familiar with the hair styles and clothing worn by young
men in the area. The motion, along with several subsequent motions
based on the same claim, were denied and Jones was convicted.
The intermediate appellate court rejected defendant's constitu-
tional arguments and held that a jury drawn from anywhere within
Los Angeles County satisfied the constitutional requirements of vi-
cinage.- The court refused to define vicinage as requiring that a jury
be picked from the precise area where the crime was committed.'
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed and held that the
sixth and fourteenth amendments required that Jones be tried by a
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360 (West Supp. 1974).
2. The 77th Street Los Angeles Police Department Precinct (77th Pre-
cinct) which had been part of the Southwest Superior Court district
(Southwest District) became, by county ordinance, a part of the Central
Superior Court district (Central District). As a result jurors who resided
in the 77th Precinct served in the Central District. Due to court calendar
backlog in this District, the presiding judge ordered the trial of all crimes
committed in the Central District in the Southwest District. The jury
empanelled in these cases was drawn from the Southwest District, thereby
excluding all residents of the Central District. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d
546, 548, 510 P.2d 705, 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1973).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1058-60 (West 1970).
4. The Central District had a population that was 31 percent Negro. 9
Cal. 3d at 548, 510 P.2d at 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The Southwest
District had a population that was 7 percent Negro. Id.
5. People v. Jones, 27 Cal. App. 3d 98, 103 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Ct. App.
1972), rev'd, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
6. Id. at 102, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
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jury of the "vicinage," which the court defined to be the district
within the county where the crime was committed.7 The court based
its decision on the following principle:
Although a jury drawn either from an entire county wherein the crime was
committed or from that portion of a county wherein the crime was committed
will satisfy the constitutional requirements of "an impartial jury of the State
or district wherein the crime shall have been committed" a jury drawn from
only a portion of a county, exclusive of the place of the commission of the
crime, will not satisfy the requirement.'
7. People v. Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1973).
8. Id. at 553, 510 P.2d at 710-11, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51. Cf. People
v. Scher, 76 Misc. 2d 71, 349 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1973). This question
is not free from difficulty and American courts have divided upon the
issue. Jury of the vicinage has been held on statutory authority to mean
jury of the county. See, e.g., Murphy v. Supreme Ct., 294 N.Y. 440, 63
N.E. 2d 49 (1945). It has been held that exclusion of the residents of an
entire county within a federal district to insure a fairer trial is within the
discretion of the trial court. See Walker v. United States, 116 F.2d 458 (9th
Cir. 1940). In a case with facts similar to Jones, it was held on due process
grounds that no denial of rights existed since the jury was selected from
an area within the court's jurisdiction. State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563
(Iowa 1971). Cf. United States v. Florence, 456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); State v. Clifton, 247 La. 495, 172 So. 2d 657
(1965). It has been held that no constitutional right is violated when jurors
are selected from non-adjoining counties. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 391
S.W.2d 365 (Ky.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1965). The principle of vicin-
age is to be distinguished from venue which is "the neighborhood . . .
place or county in which an injury is declared to have been done, or fact
declared to have happened. . . . [ajlso, the county (or geographical divi-
sion) in which an action or prosecution is brought for trial, and which is
to furnish the panel of jurors. . . . It [venuel relates only to the place
where or territory within which either party may require a case to be tried.
It has relation to convenience of litigants and may be waived or laid by
consent of parties. . . ." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1727 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
See Panhandle Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 635 (1945); United
States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958). In Cores, the Court discussed the
following guidelines for laying venue: "The Constitution makes it clear
that determination of proper venue in a criminal case requires determina-
tion of where the crime was committed . . . [Tihe Court must base its
determination of the 'nature of the crime alleged and the location of the
act or acts constituting it'. . . ." Id. at 407-08. FED. R. CRIM. P. 18 states:
In Williams v. Florida,' the Supreme Court traced the historical
development of trial by jury at common law and concluded that not
all features of the jury system had been embodied in the Constitu-
tion."' As to the right to be tried by a jury of the vicinage the Court
commented: "Indeed, pending and after the adoption of the Consti-
tution, fears were expressed that Article III's provision failed to
preserve the common-law right to be tried by a 'jury of the vicin-
age'." " Ultimately, this concern led to the introduction of the jury
trial provisions of the sixth and seventh amendments. 2 The words
of the sixth amendment, "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law" reflected a new defi-
nition of the "vicinage" requirement and was a compromise be-
tween broad and narrow definitions of the term. Implicitly, the new
definition gave Congress the power to determine the size of the
"Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecu-
tion shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed. The
court shall fix the place of trial within the district with due regard to the
convenience of the defendant and the witnesses." See United States v.
Sorce, 308 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 957 (1964).
9. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id. at 93. "[Tlhe Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. art. III, § II, cl. 3.
12. 399 U.S. at 94. The Court explained, "As introduced by James
Madison in the House, the Amendment relating to jury trial in criminal
cases would have provided that: 'The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by
an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unan-
imity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requi-
sites. . . .' The Amendment passed the House in substantially this form,
but after more than a week of debate in the Senate it returned to the House
considerably altered . . . [T]he Senate remained opposed to the vicinage
requirement,,partly because in its view the then-pending judiciary bill .. .
[Judiciary Act of 1789] adequately preserved the common-law vici-
nage feature, making it unnecessary to freeze that requirement into the
Constitution . . . . The version that finally emerged from the Committee
was the version that ultimately became the Sixth Amendment. . . ." Id.
at 94-96 (footnotes omitted). See JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY 144-51
(1927); 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 435 (1789).
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"vicinage" by creating judicial districts.' The crucial issue underly-
ing the holding in Jones is the fundamental question of what the
framers of the constitution meant by "an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."' 4 Amer-
ican courts, both state and federal, have interpreted this clause in
different ways." Interwoven in the determination of the definitions
of "state and district" are considerations of venue, jurisdiction and
the proper application of the sixth amendment through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. "
The drafters of the sixth amendment, in seeking to limit the
power of the federal government, did not contemplate application
of these provisions to the states. 7 The words "state" and "district"
referred to single statewide federal districts and the separate dis-
tricts of two states, Virginia and Massachusetts.'" Other federal
districts could be and were subsequently created by Congress."
Today the concept of district means a federal jurisdictional district.
Further congressional subdivision of a federal district" into divi-
sions has been upheld under the sixth amendment vicinage require-
ment even though jurors were called from divisions within the dis-
trict other than where the crime occurred.' In Lafoon v. United
13. 399 U.S. at 96.
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); People v. Jones 9
Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
17. Maryland v. Brown, 295 F. Supp. 63, 80 (D. Md. 1969).
18. Id.
19. See Mizell v. Vickrey, 36 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1929); Quinlan v.
United States, 22 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1927).
20. The number of federal districts in each state and the number of
divisions contained in each district within the state, if any, are provided
for by statutes covering each of the fifty states. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131
(1970). In 1911, Congress first enacted legislation to establish divisions of
districts in many of the larger states for convenience of litigants and judi-
cial officers. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 81 (1970) (Alabama); id. § 123 (1970)
(Tennessee); id. § 124 (1970) (Texas).
21. So long as a division is really a division and not a district by an-
other name, it is a venue established by Congress, not a vicinage fixed by
the Constitution. Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases, 43 MICH.
L. REV. 59, 67 (1944). See Clement v. United States, 149 F. 305 (8th Cir.
1906); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1938).
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States,22 the defendant robbed a bank in the Sherman Division of
the Eastern District of Texas but was convicted in the Tyler Divi-
sion of the district. He appealed claiming that he had not waived
the venue of the Sherman Division. The court laid down the rule
that "[Tjhe constitutional requirement for trial in the state and
district of the offense does not apply to divisions within a district."23
Therefore, the question of whether a trial is in one or another divi-
sion of the same district is a question of venue and is not jurisdic-
tional since jurors may be drawn from anywhere within the dis-
trict.2' Given the principle of Lafoon2" and the applicability of the
sixth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
an argument can be made for applying the vicinage requirement on
the state level as interpreted in Lafoon. This would mean that where
a state judicial district is subdivided into divisions the constitu-
tional vicinage requirement is not violated by drawing jurors from
the district as a whole without reference to its various divisions.
In People v. Jones the districts were merely subdivisions of the
Los Angeles Superior Court. The Jones holding requires that these
districts be treated as the equivalent of federal districts. Conse-
quently, an order2 transferring part of one judicial district to an-
other for venue purposes, but not vicinage, i.e., juror selection,
22. 250 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1958).
23. Id. at 959. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 18; United States v. Ippolito, 223
F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1955); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.
1938); United States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. La. 1970); United
States v. Katz, 78 F. Supp. 21 (M.D. Pa. 1948); 1 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE (Criminal), §§ 301-07 (1969).
24. Carrillo v. Squier, 137 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1943). In Lafoon, the jurors
were all drawn from one division within the district.
25. See United States v. Partin, 320 F. Supp. 275, 278 (E.D. La. 1970).
26. Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 2(5) quoted at, 9 Cal. 3d at 557
n.12, 510 P.2d at 718-19 n.12, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59 n.12 provides:
"Whenever, in the opinion of the Presiding Judge, the calendar in any
district including the Central District, has become so congested as to jeop-
ardize the right of a party to a speedy trial or to materially interfere with
the proper handling of the judicial business in the district, he may order
the transfer of one or more cases pending in that district to another district
for trial or may order, for a limited period, that cases which may be filed
in that district shall be filed in a different district."
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would be invalid.27 In so holding, the court rejected the principle of
Lafoon and transformed the Central and Southwest Divisions of Los
Angeles County, created for administrative convenience, into juris-
dictional districts.
In Maryland v. Brown,2 the defendant sought to have his case
removed from state to federal court after the state had been granted
a change of venue from a county where defendant was in danger of
bodily harm. Interpreting the sixth amendment terms, "state and
district," the federal district court stated: "The word county was
used in section 29 of the first Judiciary Act. The words 'State and
district' were used in the Sixth Amendment. A reading of the texts
of that constitutional amendment and of that statute makes it clear
that 'district' was not meant to connote 'county,' or vice versa."29
The court went on to say: "[Iun addition, there would appear to
be nothing in the federal Constitution to prevent a state from trying
any criminal case anywhere within the state, with a state-wide jury
or with a jury selected from residents of the jurisdiction in which the
alleged offenses were committed."3' The Jones holding appears to
leave no room for a statewide jury and, to this extent, is inconsistent
with Brown.
Vicinage is a personal right and may be waived by the defendant.
Thus, where a defendant seeks a change of venue he is, in effect,
waiving his right to a jury of the vicinage.3 A court may in its
discretion and upon proper motion by the state, force a waiver of
the vicinage right. In Brown, the state secured a change of venue to
a county with fewer black citizens, because Brown was in physical
danger in the original county. Subsequently, the defendant32 sought
27. 9 Cal. 3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 711, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
28. See note 17 supra.
29. 295 F. Supp. at 81.
30. Id. at 83.
31. One court has listed the requirements for a valid waiver as:
"I KInowledge of the right [by the accused], the free exercise of an un-
coerced will, and conduct or action known to the accused which evidences
an intent to waive [i.e. presenting a motion for change of venue]." United
States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959
(1970). See Yeloushan v. United States, 339 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1964).
32. Brown was being prosecuted in Maryland state court on charges of
inciting to riot.
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to remove his trial from the state to the federal court. The federal
court hearing the removal motion examined the guarantees of the
sixth amendment and denied the removal motion, but granted the
change of venue. By implication, the court did not find an absolute
right to a jury of the vicinage even where, as in Brown, the state
legislature had defined vicinage in terms of counties.3
A similar waiver is also possible under Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4 Pursuant to Rule 20, if a defendant
consents to a transfer of his case from the district where he was
indicted to the district where he is apprehended, and enters a plea
of guilty, he is held to have waived his sixth amendment right to a
jury of the vicinage and cannot complain on appeal.35
In addition to the problem of waiver, the vicinage right is further
complicated by the statutory doctrine of the "continuing offense.""
33. "This Court does not believe that the concepts of due process or
equal protection or any other federal constitutional provision including the
Sixth Amendment prohibits removal of Brown's trial out of Cambridge by
a Maryland state court on application by the state and over Brown's objec-
tion." 295 F. Supp. at 82.
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a) provides in part: "A defendant arrested or
held in a district other than that in which the indictment or information
is pending against him may state in writing that he wishes to plead guilty
or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the district in which the indictment
or information is pending and to consent to disposition of the case in the
district in which he was arrested or is held. . . ." See, e.g., United States
v. Gallagher, 183 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1950); Sons v. United States, 295 F.
Supp. 642 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
35. In Hilderbrand v. United States, 304 F.2d 716 (10th Cir. 1962)
defendant was indicted on a murder charge in the Western District of
Washington and was apprehended in the district of Kansas. Pursuant to
FED. R. CRIM. P. 20, he consented in writing to a transfer of his case to
Kansas for entry of a plea of guilty and sentence. On appeal, appellant
contended that Rule 20 was unconstitutional as it violated U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 and U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and that consequently the Kansas
district court lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that Rule 20 was
constitutional and treated the case as one of voluntary waiver. "[T]he
constitutional provisions as to the place of trial relate to venue and are
personal privileges which may be waived, as other privileges may be
waived." 304 F.2d at 717. Contra, United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603,
616-617 (D. Ore. 1947).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Except as
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Application of the doctrine, which can result in multiple venue,
introduces yet another anomaly. The Supreme Court in Travis v.
United States:7 selected Washington D.C. as the proper district for
venue :s even though the defendants resided" in Colorado and had
begun the chain of criminal activity in that state. The holding ap-
parently contradicts the basic reason for granting a trial by a local
jury-judgment by the standards of the locality where the crime is
committed.
In Jones, the California Supreme Court relied heavily on two
cases, Alvarado v. State" and Maryland v. Brown,' to draw its
guiding principle concerning the constitutional right to a jury of the
vicinage." The court relied on a dictum in Brown which indicated
otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense
against the United States begun in one district and completed in another
or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted
in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.
Any offense involving the use of mails, or transportation in interstate or
foreign commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and prose-
cuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce or mail
matter moves."
37. 364 U.S. 631 (1961). In this case, defendants were convicted of the
crime of filing false non-communist affidavits.
38. Id. at 636. Commenting on 18 U.S.C. § 3237, the court acknowl-
edged that multiple venue exists where there are crimes involving a contin-
uously moving act. In such instances, the act for venue purposes is held to
have been committed wherever the wrongdoer roamed. In addition, use of
agencies of interstate commerce in the commission of a crime enables
Congress to place venue in any district where a particular agency was used
even if the personal presence of the offender in that district is lacking. Id.
at 634-35.
39. Cf. United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
40. 486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971).
41. 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
42. "Although a jury drawn either from an entire county wherein the
crime was committed or from that portion of a county wherein the crime
was committed will satisfy the constitutional requirement of 'an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed'
a jury drawn from only a portion of a county, exclusive of the place
of the commission of the crime, will not satisfy the requirement." 9 Cal.
3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 710-11, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350-351,
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that absent compelling reasons, residents of the district where the
crime is committed must always be included in the group from
which the jury is drawn.
An examination of Alvarado indicates that the Jones court was
persuaded to follow a case which turned on a related but different
premise, the right to "a fair possibility for obtaining a representa-
tive cross-section of the community."44 In Alvarado, the defendant,
a native Alaskan, was convicted of rape by a jury drawn from a
population which excluded fifty-five native villages, including the
scene of the offense. These villages contained 72 percent of the dis-
trict's native population. In reversing the conviction the appellate
court held:
The narrow issue with which we are presented in this case, then, is whether
in view of the .. .restriction on jury selection, Alvarado's jury panel was
drawn from a fair cross section of the community. . . .Alvarado was not
afforded an impartial jury as contemplated by the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution. . . .We . . . conclude that failure to provide
Alvarado with an impartial jury constitutes a denial of his constitutional
right to due process of law.45
43. "[Tlhere would appear to be nothing in the federal Constitution
to prevent a state from trying any criminal case anywhere within the state,
with a state-wide jury or with a jury selected from residents of the jurisdic-
tion in which the alleged offenses were committed. While there may be due
process, equal protection, or other constitutional limitations on the power
of a state governmental system arbitrarily to exclude from a jury panel
residents of the jurisdiction in which the crimes have allegedly been com-
mitted, a defendant would seem to have no right to be tried by a jury which
is selected from a population base which includes such residents if a fair
and impartial jury cannot thereby be provided or if there are other suffi-
ciently compelling reasons for excluding from the jury residents of that
jurisdiction." 295 F. Supp. at 83.
44. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 100. See People v. Jones, 9 Cal.
3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
"ITIhe term 'community' as used in cases discussing the issue of impar-
tiality, is neither the geographical equivalent of, nor the lexical synonym-
of, a local inter-county district such as the Central District of Los Ange-
les. . . . [T]he appellant's jury panel did not exclude any 'significant
element' or 'discernible class,' and consequently was not unreflective of a
representative cross-section of the 'community.' " Id. at 562, 510 P.2d at
716, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Butera,
420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
45. 486 P.2d at 898-99.
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While Alvarado did hold that the population from which the jury is
drawn must encompass the location of the alleged offense, the court
was really concerned with selecting a jury which represented a fair
cross-section of the community. A jury which affirmatively excluded
the defendant's ethnic group would not be a fair cross-section."
Moreover, unlike the defendant in Jones, Alvarado was able to show
substantial prejudice as a result of the violation of his right to an
impartial, representative jury.
In effect, the Alaska court in Alvarado adopted an approach
which the United States Supreme Court had recognized earlier in
Williams v. Florida:47 "[T]he number on a jury should probably be
large enough to . . .provide a fair possibility for obtaining a repre-
sentative cross-section of the Community."I' The Court's analysis of
a defendant's rights under the sixth amendment sought to insure
treatment of the accused which would meet a standard of funda-
mental fairness." On another occasion the Court held that the in-
tentional and systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand jury serv-
ice, solely on account of their race and color, denied a Negro defen-
dant equal protection of the laws.'" Read together the cases indicate
that while a jury must be drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community, no defendant may demand representatives of his racial
or ethnic group on the jury before which he is tried.51
46. Id. at 902. "Hence, we feel that in determining whether the source
from which a given jury is selected represents a fair cross section of the
community, we must adhere to a notion of community which at least
encompasses the location of the alleged offense." Id.
47. See note 9 supra.
48. 399 U.S. at 100.
49. "The relevant inquiry. must be the function that the particular
feature performs and its relation to the purposes of the trial." Id. at 99-
100. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
50. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); See Coleman v. Alabama, 389
U.S. 22 (1967); Cf. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) which
extended this right under the court's supervisory power over the federal
courts to permit a defendant to challenge the arbitrary exclusion of his or
any class from jury service. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 n.9
(1972).
51. Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 164 (1948). See Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) wherein the Court states: "Even the 12-
man jury cannot insure representation of every distinct voice in the com-
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In Jones, although petitioner was tried in the Central District
where fewer Negro citizens resided, there was no claim or showing
of systematic exclusion or the absence of a representative cross-
section of the community. In Alvarado, the court held that it was
unfair to exclude 72 percent of the district's native population for
juror selection purposes since there were vast cultural differences
between the people inhabiting Eskimo fishing villages" and those
living in and near municipal Anchorage. The Jones court, by basing
its decision on the right to a jury drawn from the district where the
crime occurred, was clearly influenced by the right to an impartial
representative jury. The right, however, had not been infringed
since no significant cultural differences were shown which would
require treating two adjacent districts of a single urban county as
separate communities.5 A different problem is raised when a black
citizen commits a crime in an area populated almost exclusively by
white citizens. In such a case the defendant may be eager to waive
his constitutional right to a jury of the vicinage and rely on the
discretionary remedy of a change of venue in order to secure a jury
of his peers.
The difficulty faced by the California Supreme Court in Jones
results from attempting to apply the term "district" in the sixth
amendment on the state level. In Jones, Los Angeles County was
divided into divisions for administrative convenience in a manner
similar to that by which federal districts are divided into divisions
by statute. 4 If such divisions within a federal district are not recog-
nized as separate jurisdictions and vicinages, then the divisions of
Los Angeles County should not be so recognized. In the event that
county officials deliberately divide districts so that crimes commit-
ted by Negroes in predominantly Negro areas are tried in divisions
munity, particularly given the use of the peremptory challenge." In New
York use of the peremptory challenge is provided for by statute. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1971).
52. 486 P.2d at 894-895.
53. In Alvarado, the Eskimo village of Chignik and municipal Anchor-
age were divided by profound cultural differences in such areas as econ-
omy, language, religion and race. In Jones there were no such differences
shown between the Central and Southwest Districts. 9 Cal. 3d 564, 557,
510 P.2d 705, 718, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 358 (dissenting opinion).
54. See note 20 supra.
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populated solely by white citizens, relief could be afforded under the
due process clause for either systematic exclusion or deprivation of
a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community.5 In Jones,
the petitioner makes no claim of prejudice in his conviction, but
simply asserts that he was denied a jury from the district wherein
the crime was committed. In its holding the court agrees that no
showing of prejudice is necessary. In a dictum, the court stated that
even if the two judicial districts, one being the district where the
alleged crime happened and the other being the district from which
the jury was selected, had contained an identical proportion of Ne-
groes, the defendant nevertheless would be entitled to a jury drawn
from a panel including residents of the judicial district where the
crime was committed." This dictum is unsound since it advocates
a blindly mechanical application of federal constitutional principles
to the states without any regard for the policy upon which they are
based-fairness for the criminal defendant.
55. See note 44 supra.
56. 9 Cal. 3d at 555, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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CRIMINAL LAW-Multiple Jury Joint Trials-On the Joint
Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling of Two Juries Simul-
taneously is Permissible. United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973).
Sidman was indicted in federal court' on three separate counts of
armed bank robbery in California. Counts 2 and 3 named two ac-
complices, Carroll and Clifford respectively.2 The instant case dealt
only with the trial on count 2 in which two juries were empanelled
to try Sidman and Clifford simultaneously. When testimony proba-
tive as to Sidman, but prejudicial to Clifford was about to be admit-
ted through cross-examination, the jury sitting in judgment of Clif-
ford was excused. Upon completion of the prejudicial testimony, the
Clifford jury was readmitted.3 Both Sidman and Clifford were con-
victed by their respective juries. On appeal, Sidman's conviction
was affirmed and Clifford's reversed.4
The concept of a jury trial originated in the English common law, '
and was incorporated in principle into the United States Constitu-
tion.6 In Patton v. United States,7 the Supreme Court construed the
1. Because both banks were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the federal courts had jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970).
2. Carroll testified that he was also Sidman's accomplice on count 1,
although he was not so charged. He plead guilty to count 3. United
States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1972). Carroll's
testimony was significant in the separate trial and conviction of John
Sidman for robberies one and three.
3. United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1127 (1973).
4. Id. at 1163, 1171.
5. See M. J. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM (1968); F. H.
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1969).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III; Id, amend. VI, wherein the following provisions
are noted: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury," Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . and to be informed of the nature of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense," Id. amend. VI.
7. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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phrase "trial by jury" to mean:
a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all
the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England
when the Constitution was adopted . . . [t]hose elements were-(1) that the
jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less; (2) that the trial
should be in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having
power to instruct them as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts;
and (3) that the verdict should be unanimous.'
Today, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure outline the proce-
dures to be followed in criminal proceedings:9 Rule 23 permits trial
with less than twelve jurors and trial without a jury in certain in-
stances;' and Rule 43 requires the defendant be present at every
stage of his trial."
8. Id. at 288; See also Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 131 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943), citing
the same definition 46 F. Supp. at 423.
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1. "These rules govern the procedure in the courts
of the United States and before the United States commissioners in all
criminal proceedings, with the exceptions stated in Rule 54." Rule 54
indicates geographic exceptions, limitation of "officer-ship" authority,
removal proceedings, trials before commissioners and other non-
substantive comments.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23: "Trial by Jury or by the Court. (a) Trial by
Jury. Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defen-
dant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the
consent of the government. (b) Jury of Less than 12. Juries shall be of
twelve but at any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing
with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number
less than twelve. (c) Trial Without a Jury. In a case tried without a jury
the court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find
the facts specially. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will
be sufficient if the findings of fact appear therein."
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43: "Presence of the Defendant. The defendant.
shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including
the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposi-
tion of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecu-
tions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary ab-
sence after the trial has been commenced in his presence shalt not prevent
continuing the trial to and including the return of the verdict. A corpora-
tion may appear by counsel for all purposes. In prosecutions for offenses
punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or
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Although the basic right of trial by jury has been preserved
throughout our history, certain procedural modifications, by necess-
ity, have been adopted in judicial decisions. One such modification,
of central importance to Sidman, concerns the limiting instruction.
When two defendants are tried simultaneously, certain evidence
may be admissible against one and not the other. In the past, this
problem was overcome through the use of the limiting instruction.
The judge would instruct the jury that the evidence is admitted only
against the one defendant and is to be disregarded with respect to
the other. During the Sidman pre-trial stages, it became evident
that Carroll, Sidman's confessed accomplice in robberies one and
three, would be delivering testimony that was potentially prejudi-
cial to Clifford. In a conversation with Carroll, Sidman had stated
that his associate in robbery number two was Clifford. Carroll's
testimony was admissible against Sidman as an admission but
inadmissible against Clifford due to the hearsay rule. In the past the
limiting instruction would have been used in this situation.
As late as 1957, in Delli Paoli v. United States,12 the Supreme
Court held that the use of the limiting instruction in a joint trial was
sufficient to enable the jury to disregard a co-defendant's extra-
judicial post-conspiracy statement inculpating another co-
defendant. Delli Paoli involved a joint trial of five defendants, dur-
ing which Delli Paoli was inculpated by the confession of his co-
defendant. The Supreme Court found that the confession was ad-
missible against the co-defendant and that prejudice to Dell Paoli
was avoided by the limiting instructions. The Court presumed that
the jury was capable of following the instructions and found that no
rights of the defendant had been infringed. The confession, which
merely corroborated what the prosecution had previously estab-
lished, was not introduced until the end of the government's case
and there was no evidence of jury confusion.
The limiting instruction had been widely criticized before Delli
Paoli. Judge Learned Hand had addressed the problem several
both, the court, with the written consent of the defendant, may permit
arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in the defendant's ab-
sence. The defendant's presence is not required at a reduction of sentence
under Rule 35."
12. 352 U.S. 232, 240, 241 (1957).
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times. Such an instruction, he stated, is a "recommendation to the
jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody else's."' 3 "Nobody can indeed fail to doubt whether the
caution is effective, or whether usually the practical result is not to
let in hearsay.' 4 "[I]t is indeed very hard to believe that a jury
will, or for that matter can, in practice observe the admonition."' 5
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Delli Paoli,'" described the limit-
ing instruction as "intrinsically ineffective" and as a "futile colloca-
tion of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defen-
dants against whom such a declaration should not tell."'7
In 1968, Bruton v. United States," overruled Delli Paoli" when
the Court found that the limiting instructions were insufficient to
protect the defendant. Bruton and Evans were tried jointly and
convicted of armed postal robbery. At the trial, a postal inspector
testified that Evans had orally confessed that he and Bruton had
committed the robbery. Since Evans did not testify, Bruton could
not cross-examine him on the accuracy of his confession. The jury
was clearly instructed" that, while the confession was admissible
against Evans,' it was inadmissible and could not be considered as
13. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 556 (1932).
14. United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1948).
15. Delli Paoli v. United States, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956).
16. 352 U.S. 232, 246 (1957).
17. Id. at 247.
18. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19. Id. at 126.
20. In regard to the confession of co-defendant Evans, the trial court
instructed the jury that the confession, "if used, can only be used against
defendant Evans. It is hearsay insofar as the defendant George William
Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it in any respect to the
defendant Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay." The
judge again instructed the jury at the trial's conclusion: "A confession
made outside of court by one defendant may not be considered as evidence
against the other defendant, who was not present and in no way party to
the confession. Therefore . . . you must not consider it, and should disre-
gard it, in considering the evidence in the case against the defendant
Bruton." Id. at 125 n.2.
21. Under the controlling view towards admissions being an exception
to the hearsay rule, Evans' extrajudicial statements were admissible
against him. See generally, Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the
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evidence against Bruton. On certiorari, the Court reversed. It held
that due to the substantial risk that the jury had disregarded the
trial judge's instruction and considered Evans' incriminating state-
ments as evidence against Bruton, the admission of the Evans con-
fession violated Bruton's right of cross-examination secured by the
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.22
In Bruton, the Court determined that a thought implanted in the
minds of the jurors could not be removed by a mere instruction from
the bench. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Bruton,
succinctly summarized the decision: "A basic premise . . . is that
certain kinds of hearsay are at once so damaging, so suspect, and
yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such
evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever
instructions the trial judge might give."2"
Cautioned by the Court's holding in Bruton regarding the limiting
instruction, the Sidman court faced what it termed "the Bruton
problem"24 by empanelling two separate juries to try Sidman and
Clifford at the same time. When evidence inadmissible against one
defendant but admissible against the other was to be presented, the
jury for the former defendant would retire from the courtroom. One
of the first questions addressed was the constitutional soundness of
multiple jury joint trials. Generally, the concept of trying more than
one defendant simultaneously is unusual in our jurisprudential tra-
dition.25 Nevertheless, the ubiquitous problems of burdened trial
dockets, overworked courts, and the necessity of speedy disposition
of criminal cases makes joint trials desirable. As the Supreme Court
stated in Kotteakos v. United States,2" "[t]here are times when of
necessity, because of the nature and scope of the particular federa-
tion, large numbers of persons taking part must be tried
Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921). See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 262 (2d ed. 1972).
22. The sixth amendment of the Constitution requires that "[in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. .to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." See note 6 supra.
23. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 138.
24. 470 F.2d at 1167.
25. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). "[Tlhe pro-
ceedings are exceptional to our tradition ... " Id. at 773.
26. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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together. . . . [W]hen many conspire, they invite mass trial
''27
At the Sidman trial, it was emphasized by the government that a
multiple jury joint trial would serve to save the time of the wit-
nesses, jurors and the courts."
As previously noted, the sixth amendment guarantees the right
of confrontation." In any joint trial, the prosecution runs the risk
of improperly admitting testimony prejudicial to one of the several
defendants. Any method used to introduce that evidence in a non-
prejudicial fashion, which sacrifices a defendant's right of confron-
tation, will be severely criticized and may lead to reversal. The joint
trial method results in the desired speed and economy but it cannot
be allowed to deprive the defendant of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. As Justice Lehman noted in his dissent in People v. Fisher:3"
We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation
of the witnesses against him and the right to cross-examine them ...
We destroy the age-old rule which in the past has been regarded as a
fundamental principle of our jurisprudence by a legalistic formula, required
of the judge, that the jury may not consider any admissions against any party
who did not join in them. We secure greater speed, economy and convenience
in the administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of
constitutional liberty. That price is too high.'
Both Sidman and Clifford were convicted by their respective ju-
ries, and both appealed.2 Sidman's appeal stressed that his trial
was experimental, that certain procedures had stultified his coun-
sel, that his right to public trial had been violated because the use
of two juries resulted in public exclusion pro tanto, and that the
Sidman jury was denied the right to hear the testimony of Clifford. 3
Clifford contended the Bruton rule had been violated in his case,
despite the specific effort made to avoid the Bruton problem.34 Both
27. Id. at 773.
28. 470 F.2d at 1170.
29. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
30. 249 N.Y. 419, 164 N.E. 336 (1928).
31. Id. at 432, 164 N.E. at 341.
32. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
33. 470 F.2d at 1168-70.
34. Id. at 1170. Clifford's theory was that testimony inapplicable to
him was admitted in the presence of his jury over his hearsay objection,
thereby causing irreparable damage. The balance of the evidence against
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appeals were ordered consolidated and the court considered each
appeal seriatim.
The court first answered Sidman's allegations. The challenge
based on alleged experimentation was dismissed, because adequate
safeguards were maintained. Fair new procedures which facilitated
proper fact finding were allowable, despite any lack of precedent.n 5
The criticism directed at the alleged stultification of Sidman's
counsel was also dismissed. The court of appeals found that counsel
"had the extraordinary advantage of cross-examining Carroll in
front of the Clifford jury without the least danger of hurting his
defense of Sidman, since the Sidman jury was not present, and,
armed with what he learned, he cautiously and adroitly cross-
examined Carroll before the Sidman jury . . . .Instead of stultify-
ing counsel, it made- him prudent and perspicacious."3 Sidman's
contention that the public was excluded pro tanto by having two
juries hear his case simultaneously, thereby taking up more space,
was held to be inaccurate, since the second jury took up very little
room.:7 The fact that Sidman, as was his right, chose not to call
Clifford as a witness, negated any merit in the charge that the
Sidman jury did not hear Clifford's testimony. 8 Finding no error,
Sidman's conviction was affirmed."
him was insubstantial and his conviction indicated that the limiting in-
struction from the bench had been disregarded.
35. But see Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958). In a civil
wrongful death action prior to the reaching of the verdict, the jury was
permitted to disperse after being admonished not to discuss the case with
anyone. Upon being assembled the following day, they stated, that they
had not discussed the case with anyone and reached a verdict seven hours
later. It was held not to be an abuse of discretion and not prejudicial. Id.
at 529. See also text accompanying note 12 supra. Different and complex
trials may call for liberal use of the judge's discretion in managing the trial.
In Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the trial court
was held to have the discretion to permit a jury to separate after daily
deliberations in a homicide case if the separation was attended with those
precautions necessary to secure entire freedom from external influences.
Id. at 612.
36. 470 F.2d at 1169-70.
37. Id. at 1170.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The Clifford conviction, however, despite the careful employment
of safeguards, was reversed on appeal." Although conspiracy was
not alleged, Sidman and Clifford had been jointly charged with
robbing the Valley National Bank and were being jointly tried for
the crime. Testimony admitted against them collectively had to
conform to the rules of evidence governing testimony admitted in a
conspiracy. As was stated in Kay v. United States,4 "[w]here, as
in Bruton, the chief objective of the conspiracy has ended, either in
success or failure, the extra-judicial statements of a co-defendant
are not admissible."4 There was no relationship or conspiracy be-
tween Carroll and Clifford.43 Therefore, if Carroll were to offer
admissible testimony about statements by Sidman implicating Clif-
ford, such statements would have to have been made at a time prior
to the termination of the Sidman/Clifford criminal venture. In
terms of the admissibility of the evidence and the preservation of
Clifford's rights, the time when the conspiracy ended became cru-
cial.
During the prosecution's redirect examination of Carroll, (the
government's witness), in the presence of the Clifford jury, the pros-
ecutor asked Carroll: "'What did Mr. Sidman tell you in regard to
the robbery of the bank on February 20, 1970?' Defense counsel's
hearsay objection was overruled and Carroll replied, '[h]e told me
that him and Mr. Clifford robbed it.' "" Since the Sidman/Clifford
relationship had terminated prior to the time of this conversation
its admission proved fatal. Judge Murphy, writing for the majority
of the appellate court, stated: "We cannot say that the Bruton error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Other evidence linking
Clifford to the robbery was not overwhelming."45
40. Id. at 1171.
41. 421 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 1010. See also 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079 (J. Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1972); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 267 (2d ed. 1972).
43. See note 45 infra.
44. 470 F.2d at 1170.
45. Id. at 1171. The appellate court's description of the admission of
this fatal error continues: "Testimony by two eyewitnesses who identified
Clifford as one of the robbers was not strong. The remaining evidence was
Carroll's testimony that Clifford [sic] told him that he and Sidman [sic]
robbed the bank. The jury's assessment of this evidence, had it not heard
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It is ironic that, while the court attempted to obviate the Bruton
problem through the multiple jury joint trial concept, error still
occurred. However, this error could have been avoided with greater
care. The testimony should have been admitted in the presence of
the Sidman jury only. The reversal of Clifford's conviction indicates
an evidentiary mistake rather than a basic flaw in the concept of
multiple juries.
The court of appeals did note several theoretical problems not
raised in the Sidman appeal. It is possible that the safeguards, such
as concern for jury selection, " will overwhelm the economies of the
approach. If concern over the economies of time is divided into three
categories-jury, witness, and the court-the court's is of para-
mount concern. If the court must expend too great a time in provid-
ing safeguards the joint trial victory would be pyrrhic.
The appellate court further noted that the Sidman court did not
place a limit on the number of juries which could be convened at
the same time. The use of more than two juries could result in
exclusion of the public, which might be considered a constitutional
violation. 7 The possible unwieldliness in the administration of more
than two juries should also be considered.
Related to the problems in the administration of the trial is a
potential subtle advantage one defendant may gain over another.
When a co-defendant's jury is temporarily excused due to prejudi-
cial matter to be presented, his attorney may nevertheless cross
examine the witnesses called. Armed with what he learns, the coun-
sel may subsequently have the opportunity to question the sane
witnesses before his client's own jury. This apparently occurred dur-
ing the Sidman trial, yet the court merely commented on the prac-
Carroll testify to Sidman's confession, is highly problematical." Id. The
record is silent as to any such conversation. Carroll never had any relation-
ship with Clifford. The record reveals it was Sidman who had the conversa-
tion with Carroll. Id. All references to this conversation, coupled with the
spirit of the decision, make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
statement of the court contains a typing error, i.e. the names have been
transposed. Read the way it appears it is a meaningless statement.
46. Id. at 1168. The judge was forced to repeat his general voir dire
when the panel of veniremen was exhausted before the selection of the
Sidman jury, and more veniremen were required.
47. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
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tice," and did not explain why Sidman's attorney had this extra-
ordinary advantage. Since Sidman stood only to gain, his objection
was misplaced. Any possible objection should have been made by
Clifford, who did not receive the same advantage. Further, there is
also the danger of permitting one defendant's counsel to glimpse the
tactics of the prosecutor in the trial of the co-defendant.49
Although the procedure was upheld, the trial court set out no
guidelines, an omission which was criticized by the court of ap-
peals. Guidelines must be incorporated before the concept can be
consistently relied on. Meticulous explanations by the judge during
trial can be employed, ' and attention should be paid to some of the
points raised by this appeal.' Section 207 of the United States
Code, 2 and Rules 5751 and 5011 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
48. 470 F.2d at 1169, 1170.
49. In the Bruton decision, Mr. Justice White's dissent noted "the
common prosecutorial experience of seeing codefendants who are tried
separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be
the first to be tried." 391 U.S. at 143 (White, J., dissenting).
50. 470 F.2d at 1168. "The Judge was meticulous in explaining to the
entire panel and to each jury that there would be two juries, one to try the
guilt or innocence of Sidman and the other to try the guilt or innocence of
Clifford, and instructed each jury not to talk to anyone about the trial and
particularly not to talk to any of the other jurors in the other case. He even
gave an appellation to each jury, that is, one he called the Clifford jury
and the other the Sidman jury . . . . on oral argument . . . one jury sat
in the regular jury box and the other jury in chairs immediately in front
of the jury box."
51. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970): "Rule-making power generally. The Su-
preme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time
to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall
be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed by the Supreme Court."
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57: Rules of the Court. "(a) Rules by District Court
and Courts of Appeals. Rules made by district courts and courts of appeals
for the conduct of criminal proceedings shall not be inconsistent with these
rules. Copies of all rules made by a district court or court of appeals shall
upon their promulgation be furnished to the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. The clerk of each court shall make appropriate
arrangements, subject to the approval of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, to the end that all rules as provided
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Procedure, all dealing with the court's rule making and administra-
tive powers, must also be considered.
It is submitted that the multiple jury joint trial is not a panacea
and to treat it as such will undoubtedly pervert its usefulness. It is
a modification of the jury trial concept, much like numerous other
modifications previously mentioned.5 Given particular circumstan-
ces, it can be a smooth alternative to an unnecessary expenditure
of time. The idea, however, desperately needs direction. It was for
this reason that the appellate court, while upholding the conviction,
did not endorse the procedure." This "reserved" approval has
apparently been accepted by the Supreme Court,"7 but acceptable
guidelines must be promulgated if multiple jury joint trial are to be
endorsed without qualifications.
herein be published promptly aihd that copies of them be made available
to the public. (b) Procedure not Otherwise Specified. If no procedure is
specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful man-
ner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 50: "Calendars. The district courts may provide
for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars. Preference
shall be given to criminal proceedings as far as practicable."
55. See notes 5 - 9 supra and accompanying text.
56. 470 F.2d at 1170.
57. On January 15, 1973, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 409 U.S.
1127.
1974]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Statutory Interpretation-Factors
to be Considered in Making a Threshold Determination that an
Environmental Impact Statement Is Necessary Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)I was passed by
Congress in 1969 as part of an effort to protect the environment.'
The purposes of NEPA are to declare a policy which will promote
efforts to protect the environment, to stimulate the health and wel-
fare of man, and to enrich the understanding of the natural re-
sources important to the nation. ' NEPA requires all federal agencies
to develop decision making procedures that include an evalua-
tion of factors the agency will consider in deciding whether a pro-
posed agency action will significantly affect the "human environ-
ment."'
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
2. Id. § 4321. One of the purposes of NEPA is to "stimulate the health
and welfare of man. . . ." Id. Therefore, the congressional power to enact
NEPA is derived from its power to provide for the general welfare under
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). "The purposes of this Act are: To declare
a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological
systems and natural resources important to the Nation. . . ." Id. In sec-
tion 101 of NEPA, Congress declares that it recognizes "the profound
impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the
natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population
growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploi-
tation, and new and expanding technological advances and recognizing
further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental
quality to the overall welfare and development of man ... " 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
4. Id. § 4332 (1970). The relevant portions of § 102 of NEPA
provide: "The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: . . .(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-(A) utilize
a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts
in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment; (B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in con-
sultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by sub-
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The agencies are required to prepare an environmental impact
statement whenever their "threshold determination" indicates that
a proposed action will "significantly [affect] the quality of the
human environment."' This "threshold determination" is impor-
tant since it will determine whether a federal agency can immedi-
ately begin its proposed action or whether it will have to make a
more detailed investigation and prepare an environmental impact
statement. The statement must include a report on the unavoidable
effects that a proposed action will have on the human environment,
chapter II of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate considera-
tion in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed
statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain
the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or
special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved
. .. (D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved con-
flicts concerning alternative uses of available resources; . . . (G) initiate
and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of
resource-oriented projects. . . ." Id. Under NEPA, a federal agency con-
templating an action must make a threshold determination of whether an
environmental impact statement is required. This determination must be
made before the federal agency considers the possible future impact of its
proposed actions on the human environment. The deciding factor in the
threshold determination is whether or not the proposed action is a "major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. . . ." Id. Prior federal conservation laws are of no help in this area.
None of them refer to the term "environment." 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-1021
(1970). The meaning of "significant" is also important. See Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
[Vol. II
NOTES
the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance of long-term productivity, and any irrev-
ersible commitments of resources resulting from the proposed ac-
tion." This note will examine a basic problem in the application of
NEPA-what factors are to be considered in making a threshold
determination that an action will significantly affect the quality of
the "human environment."
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),7 a supervisory
board established by NEPA to advise the President on environmen-
tal matters, has not specified the factors to be considered by a
federal agency in making a threshold determination.' The Presi-
dent, in articulating the purpose and policy of NEPA, has also failed
to define these factors.' Some commentators claim that by writing
broad goals into NEPA and by not prescribing the factors to be
considered in defining the concept of "human environment," Con-
gress "invited ambiguity in the enforcement process and contradic-
6. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
8. 14 C.F.R. § 1204.1103(A)(2) (1973). "[T]he statutory clause
'major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment' is to be construed [by agencies] with a view to the overall,
cumulative impact of the action proposed (and to further actions contem-
plated). Such actions may be localized in their impact, but if there is
potential that the environment of a local area may be significantly af-
fected, the statement is to be prepared. Proposed actions,the environmen-
tal impact of which is likely to be highly controversial, should be covered
in all cases." Id.
9. Exec. Order No. 11514, PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, 3 C.F.R. 285 (1973), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970). In this
Executive Order, the President sets out eleven responsibilities of the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality. One responsibility is to "[p]romote the
development and use of indices and monitoring systems (1) to assess envi-
ronmental conditions and trends, (2) to predict the environmental impact
of proposed public and private actions, and (3) to determine the effective-
ness of programs for protecting and enhancing environmental quality." Id.
at 286. Another responsibility set out is that the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) shall "[i]ssue guidelines to Federal agencies for the prepa-
ration of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal
actions affecting the environment, as required by section 102(2)(C) of the
Act." Id. Excerpts from the CEQ guidelines are reprinted in note 8 supra.
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tions in the courts.""' Federal agencies, unable to discern the mean-
ing of "human environment," have had difficulty in deciding what
factors to consider in making the threshold determination that an
impact statement is required." Are federal agencies, under NEPA,
to consider only such things as pollution, population congestion,
and similar items, i.e. "physical" factors; or must they also consider
factors such as increased risk of crime'2 and other "social" factors?"
10. The Wall St. Journal, Aug. 23, 1973, at 16, col. 1. NEPA "is woe-
fully ambiguous as it relates to the work of the independent regulatory
agencies, and it is an invitation to litigation to which numerous 'public
interest' intervenors in agency cases have already responded with alac-
rity." Voigt, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent
Regulatory Agency: Some Unresolved Conflicts, 5 NATURAL REsOURCES
LAW. 13 (1972) (footnote omitted).
11. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
12. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
13. It has been acknowledged that the federal agencies' task is "magni-
fied further when the definition of 'environment' takes in physical, es-
thetic, social and cultural values." The Wall St. Journal, Aug. 23, 1973,
at 16, col. 2. This distinction between so-called "physical" factors and
"esthetic, social and cultural" factors is also important to ensure that
federal agencies acting under NEPA do not encroach on local government's
zoning powers. Closely akin to the environmental considerations required
by NEPA are the determining factors of the zoning laws. Zoning is "a
division of a municipality into zones or districts and the imposition of
structural and use restrictions within the established zones or districts."
Profett v. Valley View Village, 123 F. Supp. 339, 343 (N.D. Ohio 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); see 1 N. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.12 (1968). "The governmental power to in-
terfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by
restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions
aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Nectow
v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928). "[One of the purposes of zoning
is to 'stabilize the uses of land' and to 'furnish a protection to residential
neighborhoods which will cause them to maintain themselves in a decent
and sanitary way for a longer time than they otherwise would. ... .
Lewis v. District of Columbia, 190 F.2d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (footnotes
omitted). The zoning power of any municipality originates from an ena-
bling statute passed by the state legislature. E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND
PRACTICE § 14 (1948). The final decisions as to the zoning ordinance are
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The legislative history of NEPA, although not as clear as one
would hope, does give some guidance.'4 During the fall of 1969,'
after a conference between NEPA's managers in both Houses of
Congress, Senator Jackson, the floor manager of NEPA, commented
on "the inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions
for environmental management"'" as follows:
We see increasing evidence of this inadequacy all round us: haphazard
urban and suburban growth; crowding, congestion, and conditions within our
central cities which result in civil unrest and detract from man's social and
psychological well-being; . critical air and water pollution problems;...
the degradation of unique ecosystems .... 17
While this statement might suggest that both social and physical
factors should be considered in a NEPA determination, the Senator
may also be suggesting that physical factors be considered in light
of their impact on "man's social . . . well-being."'8 The latter inter-
pretation is strengthened by Senator Jackson's statement made sev-
eral months earlier than the one quoted above, that the purpose of
NEPA is "to achieve a standard of excellence in man's relationships
to his physical surroundings."'"
made by the legislative body of the local government that passes the zoning
law. Id. at § 66. The purpose of a zoning ordinance is to promote the public
health, safety, and general welfare. McMahon v. Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154,
160 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833 (1958). It is contended here that
if NEPA permits federal agencies to base their determinations on "morals"
or "general welfare" considerations NEPA will be encroaching on local
governments' zoning powers. Therefore, it is important to determine the
scope of the term "environment" as used in NEPA.
14. See notes 16-35 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 Saved
From "Crabbed Interpretation," 52 BOSTON U.L. REV. 425, 436 (1972).
16. 115 CONG. REc. 40417 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson).
17. Id. (emphasis added),
18. Id.
19. Id. at 29056 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Senator Jackson
stated: "What is involved is a declaration that we do not intend, as a
government or as a people, to initiate actions which endanger the contin-
ued existence or the health of mankind. That we will not intentionally
initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the resources which
support life on earth. An environmental policy is a policy for people. Its
primary concern is with man and his future. The basic principle of the
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In the Senate, NEPA was referred to the Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, ° which also seemed to define the human
environment in terms of physical factors. The Committee stated
that "[tlo provide a basis for advancing the public interest, a Con-
gressional statement is required of the evolving national objectives
of managing our physical surroundings, our land, air, water, open
space and other natural resources and environmental amenities."'"
The Committee noted that the purpose of NEPA "is to establish,
by Congressional action, a national policy to guide Federal activities
which are involved with or related to the management of the envi-
ronment or which have an impact on the quality of the environ-
ment."22 By using the terms "land, air, water, open space,"23 it
would appear that the Committee intended to define environment
in terms of physical factors.
Statements made by various members of the House of Represent-
atives intimately connected with NEPA's passage are similar to
Senator Jackson's statements. Congressman Dingell, a sponsor of
NEPA, stated:
[Tihe passage of this legislation will constitute one of the most significant
steps ever taken in the field of conservation. With the establishment of the
Council on Environmental Quality, we can now move forward to preserve and
enhance our air, aquatic, and terrestrial environments .... 24
Congressman Dingell apparently viewed NEPA as a conservation
bill. His observation regarding "our air, aquatic, and terrestrial en-
vironments, 25 indicates that he too defined "environment" in terms
of physical factors. This statement may be read to imply that the
Act is concerned with physical factors such as air and water and is
policy is that we must strive, in all that we do, to achieve a standard of
excellence in man's relationships to his physical surroundings. If there are
to be departures from this standard they will be exceptions to the rule and
the policy. And as exceptions they will have to be justified in the light of
public scrutiny." Id. (emphasis added).
20. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 6.
24. 115 CONG. REC. 40924 (1969) (remarks of Representative Dingell)
(emphasis added).
25. Id.
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not concerned with social factors such as the possible increase in
crime and drug traffic which might result from an agency action.
Congressman Garmatz,2' a manager of the bill, gave support to
this interpretation by defining the aspects of our environment in
terms of "air, land, and water" as the only factors within the scope
of NEPA. ' However, air, land, and water may simply be examples
of aspects of the environment, and Congressman Garmatz may
never have intended that the definition of environment be limited
solely to these examples.
Prior to the enactment of NEPA, the various states had virtually
no law concerning the environment as such. 9 Many states, includ-
ing New York,"' had enacted various conservation laws, which pro-
tected wildlife, waterways, and forests.3 ' Since these state statutory
laws dealt with specific conservation problems as distinct from the
environment in general, they do not help clarify the meaning of
human environment under NEPA. 
1
Since the enactment of NEPA, a number of states have enacted
environmental protection laws.32 For the most part, these laws deal
26. Congressman Garmatz was one of the five representatives of the
House of Representatives at the conference between the two Houses. Id.
at 40926.
27. Id. (remarks of Representative Garmatz).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., note 31 infra.
30. N.Y. CONSERV. LAW (McKinney 1967). The subject matter of the
law was as follows: "AN ACT relating to conservation of land, forests,
waters, parks, hydraulic power, fish and game. . . " Id. Preamble
art. 1 (McKinney 1967). The law is divided into the following Articles:
Lands and Forests (art. 3); Oil and Gas (art. 3-A); Division of Fish and
Game (art. 4); Water Resources Commission (art. 5); Division of Water
Resources (art. 6); Water Compacts (art. 7); Division of Parks (art. 16);
Gas, Oil, and Minerals (art. 20); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW (McKinney 1967).
31. Many states had conservation laws. E.g., Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17.401-.421 (1956); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 300.1-
323.203 (1967), MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 323.1-323.358 (1967); Missouri,
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 244.010-257.490 (1963), Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 261.010-
280.130 (1963); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 849-64 (1963); New
York, see note 32 supra.
32. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1201-07 (Supp. 1973);
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.412 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-1-45 (Supp. 1973).
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with the protection of the air, water, land, and other natural re-
sources. These new state environmental laws are primarily con-
cerned with physical factors-protecting the environment from pol-
lution, not social factors such as increased risk in crime or use of
drugs-problems common to the urban environment.
After the enactment of NEPA, case law dealing with the environ-
ment increased. 3 The vast majority of these cases did not prescribe
the factors to be considered in defining "the human environment. 35
However, there have been several cases which have mandated the
use of factors other than those denominated physical.
In Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 36 various inter-
ested citizens and groups sought to enjoin further construction of an
interstate highway until an environmental impact statement was
prepared pursuant to NEPA. The main issue in the case was
whether or not NEPA was to be applied to a federal action comm-
enced prior to the passage of the Act. The court found that the
highway was a "major federal [action] significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment."37 Although it differentiated
environmental considerations from social and economic effects,3"
the court held that all effects-environmental, social and eco-
nomic-had to be considered 9 in the impact statement: 9
[T]he new hearing . . . must not only seek information about the social
effects . . . its impact on the environment, and its consistency with the
33. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1203(1) (Supp. 1973); CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-01 (West. Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 22a-1 (Supp. 1973).
34. See generally 1 ENVIRON. RPTR. CAS. (1970); 2 id. (1972); 3 id.
(1972).
35. E.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971), con-
cerned injunctive proceeding to prevent further construction of a federal
highway; Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me.
1972), concerned an action to enjoin a Navy and Marine mock amphibious
landing on the beaches of a state park; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Corps of Eng'r, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), concerned an action
for injunctive relief against work on a dam.
36. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
37. Id. at 1330.
38. Id. at 1327.
39. Id. at 1339.
40. Id. at 1337.
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community's urban planning goals, but also must seek information about
• . . economic effects of the location in light of the proposed rapid rail service
The court enjoined further construction, and acquisition of land for
construction, until an impact statement had been prepared." The
decision does not, however, delineate what factors other than physi-
cal ones a federal agency must consider in deciding whether an
impact statement must be prepared.
In Groton v. Laird,' the district court sustained the Navy's
determination regarding the significance of a proposed housing
project in the town; the Navy's assessment had taken "into ac-
count the following factors: health, safety, local socio-economic
factors, transportation systems, . . . public services, and aesthet-
ics."'' Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger" was an action to enjoin con-
struction of a federal office building in downtown Mobile, Alabama.
The General Services Administration (GSA), which had chosen the
site, failed to write a detailed environmental impact statement as
required by NEPA. The plaintiffs charged, inter alia, "that the
construction of the building will create severe urban parking and
traffic congestion problems, [and] will aggravate an already
substantial air pollution problem. . . .," Although the court did
not hold that NEPA compelled consideration of these factors, they
were nevertheless legally valid concerns. However, consideration of
these factors was necessary to satisfy the mandate of GSA's own
policy for implementing NEPA which required that urban conges-
tion (including vehicular traffic, water supply, sewage treatment
facilities, other public services, threats to health, noise pollution
and undesirable land use patterns) be considered in determining
environmental impact. 7
Hanly u. Mitchell48 involved the GSA construction of an annex to
the United States Courthouse in Manhattan. Part of the annex, the
Metropolitan Correction Center (MCC), was to be used as a deten-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1339.
43. 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972).
44. Id. at 349.
45. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 466.
47. Id. at 466-67 n.6.
48. 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
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tion center for persons awaiting trial or convicted and sentenced to
a short term in prison. Space was to be provided not only for incar-
ceration, but for diagnostic services, and medical, recreational and
administrative facilities. A new program at the MCC would provide
service for non-resident out-patients.
The plaintiffs, groups residing or having their businesses in the
area where the MCC was to be constructed, sought an injunction
barring the construction on the ground that the GSA had not con-
sidered all the relevant factors which might affect the environment.
The GSA made a threshold determination that an impact statement
was not required and issued a memorandum" which considered the
following factors: "[available utilities], the adequacy of mass
transportation, the removal of trash, the absence of a relocation
problem and the intention to comply with existing zoning regula-
tions." The court held these factors inadequate in scope' and re-
quired the GSA to consider such environmental factors as the possi-
bility of riots and disturbances in the jail which might expose the
neighbors to noise,52 and dangers of crime resulting from the treat-
ment center,"3 and possible parking and traffic problems. 4 The
court found that the Act required consideration of social factors in
the urban environment: "[nJoise, traffic, overburdened mass
transportation systems, crime, congestion and even availability of
drugs all affect the urban 'environment' and are surely results of the
'profound influences of . . . high-density urbanization [and] in-
dustrial expansion.' 55
As a result of the court's opinion, the GSA submitted an "Assess-
ment of the Environmental Impact,"' which considered the follow-
ing factors: size, location, and use of the MCC; its design, construc-
tion, and aesthetic relationship to the neighborhood; the extent to
which its activities will be visible to the community; the estimated
49. Id. at 645-46.
50. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1972). See also 460
F.2d at 645-46.
51. 460 F.2d at 645-46.
52. Id. at 646-47.
53. Id. at 647.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 471 F.2d at 827.
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effects on traffic, public transit, and parking; its effect on noise,
smoke, dirt, obnoxious odors, sewage, and solid waste removal; and
its energy demands. 7 The plaintiffs contended that this did not
comply with the court's instructions, and renewed their application
for a preliminary injunction.58 Once again the court held that the
GSA had failed to make an adequate threshold determination.59 The
court held that the GSA should have made "findings with respect
to the possible existence of a drug maintenance program at the
MCC, [and] the increased risk of crime that might result from the
operation of the MCC. . . .
In neither of these cases did the court set out the type of factors
to be considered in defining the human environment in the urban
setting. In both decisions, however, the court listed the factors
which it believed should be considered in making a NEPA threshold
determination as to whether the proposed action will significantly
affect the environment. The courts held that such factors as possible
increased risk of crime and drugs were to be considered in complying
with NEPA. However, the court also noted that "psychological and
sociological effects"'" were not to be considered in a determination:
For the most part their [the plaintiffs'] opposition is based upon a psychol-
ogical distate for having a jail located so close to residential apartments,
which is understandable enough. It is doubtful whether psychological and
sociological effects upon neighbors constitute the type of factors that may be
considered in making such a determination since they do not lend themselves
to measurement."
However, the court stated that it was not deciding whether such
factors had to be considered since there was already a prison in the
area."
In First National Bank v. Richardson," the plaintiffs sought
57. Id.
58. Id. at 828.
59. Id. at 836.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 833.
62. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973). See also Maryland-Nat'l Capital
Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029
(D.C. Cir. 1973), wherein the plaintiffs brought an action under NEPA to
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to enjoin the GSA's construction of a parking garage and detention
center pending preparation of an environmental impact statement.
The GSA had determined that the statement was unnecessary.
The district court agreed, stating that GSA had not erred in
concluding that possible risk of crime " 'is not a significant environ-
mental concern.' "'1 The court of appeals, in affirming the district
court, quoted the CEQ to the effect that in urban areas many "envi-
ronmental problems interact with social and economic conditions
which the Nation is also seeking to improve."" Although the court
points out that environmental, social and economic factors are to be
balanced,i it is clear that they are viewed as being distinct from one
another. The court flatly states that as to public sensibilities, it
questions "whether such factors even if amenable to quantification,
are properly cognizable in the absence of clear and convincing evi-
dence that the safety of the neighborhood is in fact jeopardized."8
First National Bank thus conflicts with the Hanly decisions as to
the factors which constitute the environment in urban areas.
The decisions of the various courts fail to provide any clear-cut
guidelines on whether non-physical factors should be considered in
making a threshold determination of whether under NEPA the pro-
posed action will significantly affect the environment. For example,
enjoin the construction of the Washington Bulk Mail Center. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the preliminary
injunction. On appeal, the court of appeals remanded, holding that the
defendants had considered the proper factors in making their threshold
determination, but had not investigated those factors in sufficient detail.
The factors thatwere considered were: (1) the esthetics, which related to
the visual effects of the facility and the landscaping of the area (Id. at
1038); and (2) factors relating to health and the natural resources, which
included consideration of storm-water run-off, oil run-off from the parking
lot, and traffic (Id. at 1039). These factors appear to be what we have
termed physical factors for consideration in a NEPA threshold determina-
tion.
65. 484 F.2d at 1376. The court held that no environmental impact
statement was necessary since the GSA considered all pertinent factors in
determining that the project did not "significantly affect the quality of the
human environment." Id. at 1381.
66. Id. at 1377-78 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1378.
68. Id. at 1380 n.13.
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can NEPA be applied to a new housing development simply because
it may be proved that the lower classes live in a housing project, that
the crime rate is higher among the lower classes and, therefore, the
possible increased risk of crime should result in suspending the
project on environmental grounds? It is doubtful that this was the
intent of Congress in enacting NEPA. In one case, Nucleus of Chi-
cago Homeowners v. Lynn,"0 a coalition of local community organi-
zations brought an action to require the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to file an environmental impact statement.
Plaintiffs alleged that tenants of public housing have a higher
propensity for criminal behavior, and that their presence will "sig-
nificantly affect the quality of the human environment." The court
held that an environmental impact statement was not necessary,
stating that "although human beings may be polluters, they are not
themselves pollution. Environmental impact in the meaning of
NEPA cannot be construed to include a class of persons per se."70
The background of NEPA, its legislative history and its wording
fail to disclose whether such factors are to be considered. There is
nothing which states that NEPA is anything more than an environ-
mental law or that anything other than environmental factors are
within its purview.
Senator Howard Baker, presiding over the Joint Hearings before
the Committee on Public Works and the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs of the Senate on the operation of NEPA, underscored
the problems which have been discussed in this note: "It may be
that NEPA has had effects unintended by the Congress at the time
of its enactment; it may be that the Congress will at some future
time choose to make changes in NEPA."' Perhaps it is time for
Congress to re-examine NEPA and define the terms of the Act so
that it can be made workable.
69. 42 U.S.L.W. 2306 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 21, 1973).
70. Id. at 2307.
71. Joint Hearings Before the Comm. on Pub. Works and the Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, On the Operation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1972).
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LANDLORD-TENANT LAW-Dependency of Lease Cove-
nants-Covenant to Pay Rent is Dependent upon Landlord's
Warranty of Habitability. Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308
A.2d 17 (1973).
In September, 1968, Lillias Berzito entered into possession of an
apartment. There was no written lease and the rent was fixed at
$140 a month. Before she entered, Vincent Gambino, the landlord,
promised to make certain repairs that would make the premises
"liveable." He never did.' The tenant terminated all rental pay-
ments in February, 1970 and on June 18, 1970 the landlord insti-
tuted a summary dispossess action against Berzito for nonpayment.
The state district court held that Gambino was in violation of his
express warranty of habitability and reduced the rent to $75 a
month retroactive to the date the tenant stopped payments.2 Berzito
made no such payments and quit the premises on November 14,
1970.:
After vacating the premises, the tenant sought to recover the
difference between the $140 a month rent agreed upon and the re-
duced rental value of $75 a month from the commencement of her
tenancy until February, 1970 when the rental payments ceased.
Such relief was predicated upon a theory of continuing breach of
warranty throughout the entire tenancy. Gambino counterclaimed
for the reduced rent set by the court in the summary dispossess
proceeding.
The trial court ruled in the tenant's favor and rejected the land-
lord's contention that by remaining in possession the tenant had
waived the failure to repair.' The appellate division reversed 5 and
1. The district court found that these representations had in fact been
made. Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124, 129, 274 A.2d 865, 867
(Dist. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 119 N.J. Super. 332, 291 A.2d 577
(App. Div. 1972), rev'd, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973).
2. 63 N.J. at 463-64, 308 A.2d at 19.
3. Id. at 464, 308 A.2d at 19.
4. 114 N.J. Super. at 129, 274 A.2d at 868. The court held that the
"[defendant would be entitled . . . to approximately one month to com-
plete the repairs and improvements promised to make the premises habit-
able. Id. at 130, 274 A.2d at 868-69.
5. 119 N.J. Super. 332, 291 A.2d 577. The defects tenant complained
about were classified as amenities and the tenant could have quit the
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the tenant appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court. In reversing
the appellate division, the court found that the landlord had
breached his covenant of habitability' and that the tenant's cove-
nant to pay rent depended upon the fulfillment of the warranty of
habitability.7 The court went on to say that the tenant could either
institute an action against her landlord to recover all or part of any
deposits or rent paid or she could use the breach as a defense to a
summary dispossess action.'
Prior to Berzito, courts in New Jersey recognized only two tenant
remedies. The first, rooted in real property law,9 attempted to ame-
liorate the principle of caveat emptorl" by allowing the tenant to
premises if she so desired. Id. at 337, 291 A.2d at 579-80.
6. The history of habitability covenants in New Jersey is traced to
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969) where the
court recognized that all leases contained an implied covenant of habita-
bility, noting that present day demands have made old notions of landlord-
tenant law inadequate. Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d
1341 (1969). One year later the court implemented this decision and
held that the tenant could opt for relief under the warranty of habitability
if breached. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). See 40
A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970). This warranty applied only to latent defects. 56 N.J.
at 144, 265 A.2d at 534. The next logical step was applying the warranty
of habitability to patent defect situations. Samuelson v. Quinones, 119
N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972). The New Jersey Legisla-
ture has also recognized the increased rights of tenants to secure habitable
premises. 52 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
7. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
8. Id.
9. For a history of landlord-tenant law from its English development,
see Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Phillips]; Van Walraven, Landlord
and Tenant: Caveat Emptor in Oklahoma-Need for Reform, 8 TULSA L.J.
199 (1972).
10. At common law, the tenant takes the premises "as is." Today, this
notion is considered antiquated. 56 N.J. at 141, 265 A.2d at 532. There
have been movements in other states to reform caveat emptor and square
it with a more modern approach. Van Walraven, supra note 9, at 200. In
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970), the court held that caveat emptor "cannot coexist with
the obligations imposed on the landlord by a typical modern housing code,
and must be abandoned . . . ." Id. at 1076-77.
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vacate his premises when constructively evicted through the action
or inaction of his landlord." The second, recognized in 196912 and
implemented in 1970,'1 grew from the belief that traditional com-
mon law relationships were ill suited to modern living conditions
and should be relaxed." This latter remedy, the warranty of habita-
bility, gave relief to the tenant when his landlord failed to maintain
the premises in a habitable condition.'"
11. If a landlord creates a nuisance or performs acts which preclude the
tenant from beneficial enjoyment of his property, as a result of which the
tenant abandons before the rent is due, the landlord will have no action
for the rent. Dave Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 117,
149 N.E.2d 328, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1958). The breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment permits the tenant to claim a constructive eviction. R.
POWELL & P. ROHAN, ON REAL PROPERTY 225(3), at 99 (abr. 1968).
See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. at 462, 251 A.2d at 277-78, where
the landlord's failure to repair the cause of the flooding was held to breach
the covenant of quiet enjoyment and justified the tenant's vacating under
a constructive eviction. Id. Rather than quit the premises, a tenant could
sue his landlord for a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, although
he would not be permitted to stop payments. 63 N.J. at 467, 308 A.2d at
20-21. See also Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420 (1955). For a tenant to
invoke a constructive eviction, two basic elements are traditionally re-
quired: the landlord must substantially interfere with the tenant's posses-
sion, and the tenant must abandon within a reasonable period of time.
Ackerhalt v. Smith, 141 A.2d 187 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1958). See also R.
POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra, at 99. But see Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer,
61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Mun. Ct. 1946) where abandonment was not necessary
in face of the severe housing shortage. This rule, however, has not met with
much success in most jurisdictions including New York. Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519,
529-31 (1966).
12. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268.
13. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526.
14. At common law, for example, there was no duty resting on the
landlord of an apartment building to repair the rooms demised. Golob v.
Pasinsky, 178 N.Y. 458, 70 N.E. 973 (1904). His duty rested solely on those
parts of the building which were common. Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N.Y.
269, 29 N.E. 104 (1891). New Jersey relaxed traditional common law no-
tions through the warranty of habitability. See note 6 supra.
15. 63 N.J. at 466, 308 A.2d at 20. The court found that there "is . ..
little comfort to a tenant in these days of housing shortage to accord him
the right, upon a constructive eviction, to vacate the premises and end his
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There are, however, grave shortcomings in both remedies. Serious
consequences may result under a constructive eviction if "the con-
duct of the landlord is later found by the court not to have justified
the tenant in vacating the premises [since] he will remain liable
for the unpaid rent."'" In addition, the tenant may find it difficult
to secure suitable living quarters, and may be forced to incur addi-
tional moving expenses. 7
The warranty of habitability fashioned by the court permitted the
tenant to repair a defective facility and deduct the cost from his
rent. A prerequisite to relief, however, is that the facility repaired
must be vital. Since no guidelines exist, the tenant faces the possi-
bility that the facility he repairs may not be adjudged vital, and the
court will disallow a rent deduction.2 0
obligation to pay rent. Rather he should be accorded the alternative rem-
edy of terminating the cause of the constructive eviction .... " 56 N.J.
at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
16. 63 N.J. at 466, 308 A.2d at 20. The very purpose of a constructive
eviction was to absolve the tenant from any lease obligation and allow him
to remove to a more desirable location. Buoncristiani, Partial Constructive
Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for
Habitability, 21 HAST. L.J. 417, 427 (1970).
17. 56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
18. Id. But see Green v. Superior Ct., - Cal. 3d -, 517 P.2d 1168,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974) where the California Supreme Court recognized
that "the limited nature of the 'repair and deduct' remedy, in itself, sug-
gests that it was not designed to serve as an exclusive remedy for tenants
• . . [and is meant] only to encompass relatively minor dilapidations
. " Id. at -, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
19. The answer as to what constitutes a vital facility was not set forth
in Marini. The court merely held that "the landlord is required to maintain
. . .facilities in a condition which renders the property liveable." 56 N.J.
at 144, 265 A.2d at 534. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super.
477, 268 A.2d 556 (Dist. Ct. 1970) an attempt was made to distinguish a
vital facility from an amenity: "In a modern society one cannot be ex-
pected to live in a multi-storied apartment building without heat, hot
water, garbage disposal or elevator service. Failure to supply such things
is a breach of the implied covenant of habitability. Malfunction of vene-
tian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks, lack of painting, [depending upon]
the magnitude . . . go to what may be called 'amenities.' " Id. at 482, 268
A.2d at 559.
20. In Javins the court held that "[tihe jury should be instructed that
[Vol. II
NOTES
New Jersey has also extended the covenant of habitability to
landlord dispossess actions.2 In Berzito, the court recognized a ten-
ant's right to allege the landlord's breach of the covenant as a de-
fense to a summary dispossess action.22 A rent abatement for the
value of the unrepaired premises would be granted." Thus the ten-
ant has another available remedy; however, it may be illusory.
Although the rent abatement provides monetary relief to a tenant,
it does not directly compel a landlord to repair the imperfect condi-
tion. While the Berzito decision also permits a tenant to initiate his
own suit, a tenant who sues under a breach of warranty theory can
only recover if the defect is sufficiently material. Since court actions
are expensive, a tenant may not opt for available relief where the
outcome is uncertain.24
Berzito does not present a fact pattern fitting New Jersey's avail-
able remedies since "the tenant did not vacate the premises . . .
nor did she undertake the needed repairs herself and then seek to
offset the expense so incurred against her obligation to pay rent."2"
Although a prior decision held that"[t]he tenant has only the alter-
native remedies of making the repairs or removing from the prem-
one or two minor violations standing alone which do not affect habitability
are de minimus and would not entitle the tenant to a reduction in rent."
428 F.2d at 1082 n.63. See, e.g., Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d
321 (1972) where the risk a tenant takes is evident. If the court finds the
premises liveable, the tenant will be responsible for back rents.
21. 56 N.J. at 140, 265 A.2d at 531. See also Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d
160 (Wash. 1973).
22. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21; 56 N.J. at 140, 265 A.2d at 531.
23. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21. Just how much of an abatement a
court will allow is discussed in Academy Spires where the court agreed with
the language of Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555 (1931) which held that you never can have certainty: "Where
the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the
amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion . . . to deny
all relief. . . [W]hile the damages may not be determined by mere specu-
lation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the extent of dam-
ages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be
only approximate. 111 N.J. Super. at 487, 268 A.2d at 561-62.
24. A good example of this uncertainty is found in the court history of
Berzito. See notes 1, 4 & 5 supra.
25. 63 N.J. at 467, 308 A.2d at 20.
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ises upon . . . a constructive eviction,"2 Berzito found that this
"casual dictum will not shackle the Court to prevent a later exercise
of its creative powers in fashioning new remedies as need and occa-
sion demand."2 7
In extending existing remedies, the court adopted a contractual
approach to leases.2" This approach allows the tenant to
initiate an action against his landlord to recover either part or all of a deposit
paid upon the execution and delivery of the lease or part or all of the rent
thereafter paid during the term, where he alleges that the lessor has broken
his covenant to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.,
Essentially, the tenant is no longer limited to the establishment of
defenses in a landlord's action; he can take the initiative. 0 The
measure of damages, in both instances, would be a reduction in rent
to "the reasonable rental value of the property in its imperfect con-
dition during a period of occupancy."'" Thus, the court in Berzito
not only granted the tenant the relief requested, but established a
26. 56 N.J. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535.
27. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
28. The court did not hold a lease to be a contract, rather that certain
covenants would be applied to each other on a contractual basis. See note
41 infra and accompanying text. The warranty of habitability has been
applied through analogy to sales contracts. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) held that "[i]n the law of sale of chattels, the
trend is markedly in favor of implying warranties of fitness and merchanta-
bility . . . . The manufacturer is also the one who knows more about the
product and is in a better position to alleviate any problems or bear the
brunt of any losses . . . The same reasoning is equally persuasive in
leases of real property." Id. at 432, 462 P.2d at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
In Reste the court illustrates the problems of a prospective tenant: "Build-
ing code requirements and violations are known or made known to the
lessor, not the lessee. He is in a better position to know of latent defects
• . . which might go unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient knowl-
edge or expertise to see or to discover them . . . . Nor should he be ex-
pected to hire experts to advise him." 53 N.J. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
29. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22. In Ohio, a contractual approach is
taken to leasehold agreements since it is mandated by state law. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3709.21 (Baldwin 1971). See Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op.
2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct. 1972).
30. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
31. Id.
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new remedy for tenants.32
Although the lease in Berzito contained an express covenant of
habitability, the court held that it was irrelevant whether the war-
ranty of habitability was express or implied33 since "[a] lessor be-
comes liable to a lessee for any breach of this covenant."34 Therefore,
the covenant of habitability is applicable regardless of the land-
lord's intent. This reasoning is a complete rejection of the caveat
emptor doctrine35 since it imposes a responsibility upon the landlord
to keep the premises in a habitable condition.
In extending the scope of tenant remedies the court rejected a
basic notion of landlord-tenant law when it stated that:
the covenant on the part of a tenant to pay rent, and the covenant-whether
express or implied-on the part of the landlord to maintain the demised
premises in a habitable condition are for all purposes mutually dependent."
Thus, the independence of the rent covenant-long a restraint on
the tenant's bargaining power-was set aside,3" and a major tenant
disadvantage in actions against landlords was eliminated. Under
the old common law principle a tenant was forced to continue rent
payments when suing for a breach of another covenant.39 Now, since
32. An examination of the facts in Berzito and the resulting new rem-
edy indicates the necessity for this. 63 N.J. at 469-73, 308 A.2d at 20-24.
But see the reasoning of Justice Cardozo where he stated that "[e]very
new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. It may
not be modified at once, for the attempt to do absolute justice in every
single case would make the development and maintenance of general rules
impossible." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 23 (1921).
33. 63 N.J. at 467, 308 A.2d at 21.
34. Id.
35. Berzito recognized that it had rejected caveat emptor. Id. at 471,
308 A.2d at 23.
36. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
37. 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
38. The doctrine of independent rent covenants has been found consti-
tutional, and states that wish to retain it may do so. Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S. 56, 65-69 (1972).
39. "It is obviously unsatisfactory to tell him [the tenant] that he may
sue his landlord . . . but that at the same time he must make recurring
rental payments as they fall due." 63 N.J. at 468, 308 A.2d at 21.
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rent payments can be withheld,4" the landlord is under a compulsion
to settle the dispute quickly.
Dependency of covenants is the recognition of a contractual rela-
tionship. The court, however, did not extend its holding to all lease
covenants. It is only the covenant to pay rent that is dependent
upon the covenant of habitability. Therefore, New Jersey has yet to
recognize a full contractual relationship in leases."
The court left undecided the question of the landlord's exculpa-
tory clause. Once landlords realize they are held to a covenant of
habitability,42 a rational escape would be to insert a clause in leases
expressly denying a warranty of habitability.4" One jurisdiction held
that such clauses invalidate the entire lease," others permitted
exculpation," while still other courts merely struck the clause from
the lease on the grounds that it is contrary to public policy.46 A lower
40. Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21-22.
41. Berzito says nothing about the other covenants in the lease. Pre-
sumably, where the covenant does not affect habitability, a tenant would
not be allowed to stop rental payments.
42. Both Marini and Berzito have recognized the covenant. See note 6
supra.
43. While one could argue that by signing the lease the tenant has
agreed to let the landlord exculpate himself, "in the landlord-tenant situa-
tions, more often than not, and especially with the lower-income tenant,
freedom of choice, and therefore freedom of contract, is something mark-
edly less than free." Note, 7 WILLAMETTE L.J. 516, 517 (1971).
44. Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Mun. Ct.
1972) held that in viewing a lease as a contract, the court must find that
any clause which violates the existing statute will render the lease null and
void.
45. A Michigan statute permits the parties to modify the lessor's cove-
nant to keep the premises in reasonable repair where the lease has a cur-
rent term of one year or more. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 554.139 (2) (Supp.
1973).
46. Tanella v. Rettagliata, 120 N.J. Super. 400, 294 A.2d 431 (Dist. Ct.
1972). Cf. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosen-
shine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971) held the Housing
Maintenance Code of the City of New York to imply a warranty of habita-
bility in all leases of houses it covers. Id. at 327, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 366. But
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court in New Jersey followed the latter approach.47
A further consideration omitted by the court was a New Jersey
statute providing for tenant relief.4" The court declined to apply the
statute because "it did not become effective until January 21, 1971
[and] it is not directly applicable to this case." 9 This statute pro-
vides that "at the instance of a designated public official (presuma-
bly the building inspector) or at the instance of an affected tenant,
a petition may be filed with a court of competent jurisdiction
... 1, If the court finds a breach of habitability, judgment can
be entered "directing that the rents thenceforth be deposited with
the clerk of the court to be used to remedy the improper conditions
that have been found to exist." 5' While not loath to accept the
statutory remedy, the court felt that its own remedy "will in the
future afford a further remedy . . . to tenants of substandard
dwellings., 5 2
Tenants have not gained these added rights without some respon-
sibilities. The New Jersey Supreme Court was emphatic in holding
that "[als a prerequisite to maintaining . ..a suit, the tenant
must give the landlord positive and seasonable notice of the alleged
defect, must request its correction and must allow the landlord a
reasonable time to effect the repair or replacement."53 Berzito is in
cf. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App.
1972) where minor housing code violations would not impose a breach of
habitability. See note 20 supra.
47. Tanella v. Rettagliata, 120 N.J. Super. 400, 294 A.2d 431 (Dist. Ct.
1972) took notice that all statutes, whether for the landlord's or tenant's
benefit, will be superimposed on the rights and duties of both parties as
expressed in the lease. Id. at 411, 294 A.2d at 437. It is conceded that the
warranty of habitability cannot be waived in New Jersey. Note, 4 SETON
HALL L. REV. 714, 723 (1973).
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-93 (Supp. 1973).
49. 63 N.J. at 471, 308 A.2d at 23.
50. Id. at 472, 308 A.2d at 23.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 473, 308 A.2d at 24.
53. Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22. Accord, Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 130,
265 A.2d at 526 (1970). "The tenant's recourse to such self-help must be
preceded by timely and adequate notice to the landlord of the faulty condi-
tion in order to accord him the opportunity to make the necessary replace-
ment and repair." Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
1974]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
this respect consistent with prior decisions which held that before a
tenant could repair and deduct the cost, his landlord had to be given
adequate notice54 and a reasonable time in which to make repairs. 5
The rationale for a notice requirement is that if notice and a reason-
able time are given, the landlord will repair rather than face the
inevitable court action.5" While failure to give notice may release the
landlord from liability, it does not relieve the uninhabitable condi-
tion. The lessor may still be at fault for maintaining the premises
in such a condition.
Assuming that the notice requirement is met, the court must
determine whether a breach of the covenant of habitability has
occurred. In Berzito, the court cited the criteria established in
Mease v. Fox,57 an Iowa case, to determine whether a particular
defect constitutes a breach. The court looked to:
[1.] whether the alleged defect violated housing laws, regulations or
ordinances . . . . [2.] the nature of the deficiency or defect, [3.] its effect
on safety and sanitation, [4.] the length of time for which it persisted, [5.]
the age of the structure, [6.] the amount of the rent . . .
In addition, the tenant would be unable to succeed against his
landlord
[(1.) if the] tenant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the de-
fects, or is estopped to raise the question of the breach, . . . [or if (2.)] the
54. See, e.g., Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831
(Mass. 1973) where Massachusetts law required written notice on the part
of the tenant to withhold rent in order to avoid a constructive eviction.
Since the tenant had given no notice, he was evicted.
55. The district court in Berzito held that one month would be suffi-
cient time in which the landlord could effect repairs. 114 N.J. Super. at
130, 274 A.2d at 868-69.
56. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 9, at 242, indicate that new laws have
given the tenant the right either to abate or withhold rent in many instan-
ces, and it is anticipated that this type of economic pressure would force
the landlord to fulfill his service obligation. See also Comment, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 304 (1965) which sets forth the concise aspect of notice further
where "[al continued failure to comply with the standards set up in the
housing codes after notice of the violation . . . constitutes a misdemeanor,
subjecting the violator to a fine or imprisonment. Id. at 318 (footnote
omitted).
57. 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
58. Id. at 796-97.
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defects or deficiencies resulted from unusual, abnormal or malicious use by
the tenant."
Estoppel would be applied when the tenant knows of the defect and
accepts the premises without objection. The second instance is anal-
ogous to "waste." ' " A landlord is free from liability where the condi-
tion was caused by the tenant's wrongful act or omission. These acts
or omissions would then give the landlord a cause of action against
the tenant. "
While the factors listed by the court provide a viable framework,
they lack precision and fail to give sufficient guidance to a tenant
proceeding under them. The tenant will be unable to determine
whether the court views a particular defect as constituting a
breach. " Perhaps the court recognized this problem when it noted
59. Id. at 797.
60. In Whitehead v. Whitehead, 181 A. 684 (Orphans' Ct. 1935) the
court, quoting from 27 RULING CASE LAW 1010, 1012 (1929), held waste to
be "an unreasonable and improper use and abuse, mismanagement, or
omission of duty touching real estate by one rightfully in possession,
which results in substantial injury thereto." Id. at 685.
61. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
tert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) which adopted the equity principle that
no one may benefit from his own wrong, and in fact, the landlord would
be given a defense for the tenant's waste. Id. at 1082 n.62.
62. Other jurisdictions determine habitability from other factors.
Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972) applied Connecticut
statutes which provide that the tenant will not be liable for rent as long
as the premises were unfit for occupancy. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24
(1958). In Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass.
1973) the court looked to the Massachusetts statutes which disallowed
recovery to the landlord where the premises were in violation of the stan-
dards for "human habitation . . .and if such violations may endanger or
materially impair the health or safety of persons." Id. at 839. MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1972). Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67
Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971) held the Housing Mainte-
nance Code implies a warranty of habitability into all leases it covers. But
see State ex rel. Brown v. Sussman, 235 So. 2d 46 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1970) which applied a nuisance approach to deciding a breach of habitabil-
ity. The municipal housing code, if breached, is held to constitute a public
nuisance. See Comment, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 769 (1972). See also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 823.05 (1965). In Oklahoma, there are statutes which could be
interpreted, as in other states, to give the tenant an implied warranty of
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that "[ejach case must be governed by its own facts. The result
must be just and fair to the landlord as well as the tenant.""3
The New Jersey Legislature has outlined a somewhat better
framework for determining habitability. Under the statute, the ten-
ant or a designated public official must
[slet forth material facts showing that there exists ...one or more of the
following: a lack of heat or of running water or of light or electricity or of
adequate sewage disposal facilities, or any other condition or conditions in
substantial violation of the standards of fitness for human habitation estab-
lished under the State or local housing or health codes or regulations or any
other condition dangerous to life, health or safety."
The Berzito decision modified common law notions of property by
rejecting the independency of lease covenants. 5 In support of its
conclusions, the court listed ten other jurisdictions that had likewise
established dependency of covenants in their leasehold agree-
ments."'! These decisions have not only expanded the lessors respon-
sibility, but have increased the lessee's power by providing him with
additional remedies. "7 By its own admission, the court in Berzito
found that the prevailing legislative view not only influenced its
habitability; however, the courts are simply unwilling to grant it. Van
Walraven, supra note 9, at 200-04. In California, the "implied warranty of
habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that leased premises
are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean that 'bare
living requirements' must be maintained." Green v. Superior Ct., -
Cal. 3d _ , 517 P.2d 1168, 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 718 (1974)
(footnote omitted).
63. 63 N.J. at 470, 308 A.2d at 22.
64. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-90(a) (Supp. 1973).
65. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
66. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1972); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App.
1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring,
Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d
831 (Mass. 1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919
(Mun. Ct. 1972); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961),
Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
67. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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holding, "' but aided in its justification. In referring to the decision
in Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello,"' the court pointed out that a statute
often reflects legislative concern over a long standing abuse, and
may articulate a public policy predating the legislation.",
Clearly, the trend in legislation and court decisions has been for
the tenant's benefit. The landlord's duty has changed dramatically
over a relatively short period of time,7' and the tenant is rapidly
gaining equality in the landlord-tenant relationship.
68. The introductory section of the statute reads as follows: "The Leg-
islature finds: a. Many citizens of the State of New Jersey are required to
reside in dwelling units which fail to meet minimum standards of safety
and sanitation; b. It is essential to the health, safety and general welfare
of the people of the State that owners of substandard dwelling units be
encouraged to provide safe and sanitary housing accomodations for the
public . . . ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 (Supp. 1973).
69. 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973).
70. Id. at 409, 307 A.2d at 602.
71. Tanella v. Rettagliata, 120 N.J. Super. 400, 294 A.2d 431 (Dist. Ct.
1972) recognized the movement in New Jersey to balance the scale in favor
of the tenant. Accord, Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
New York has not been loath to change existing common law notions where
a statute has changed the common law rule. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y.
16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922). But see Note, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 714 (1973)
which indicates a problem which may result from increasing tenant rights.
The landlord may opt to abandon, sell the premises, or enter into bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Id. at 728.
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